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Family Labor Supply
over the Life Cycle
ABSTRACT:A life cycle model is derived to explain the allocation ot
time of family members over the life cycle. [he timing of market partk
paton is shown to depend upon the tile cycle wage pattern of nien and
women, the rate of interest, the rate of tinie preterence, and age-related
changes in the productivity of nonmarket uses of time.i The data used
to test the model are from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity and
the 1 960 and 1970 U.S. censuses. first, actual life cycle paths of working
hours of married men and women are compared to paths predicted by
theory, using synthetic cohort techniques to simulate litcycle patterns
because of the lack of adequate panel data. At this heuristic level, support
for the life cycle approach is strong. A more rigorous test (it the model is
provided by regressions explaining male ar.d female household time using
all three data sources. [hose regressions. also. art' consistent with the im-
plications of the life cycle model: increases in wage rates odor e parte
pation in the market sector for both spouses, an additional young child at
home produces greater female specialization in the household sector and
male specialization in the market sector and positive interest rates give
households incentives to consume more leisure when thee are older.
However, some anomalies exist. The most niportant is that the life cv le
behavioral patterns of black women niore t. losely parallel those ot white
men than of white women. Some suggestions are oftered to explain thisinconsistency, hut the puizle reniairunsolved.¶ In additionto it
p)carions for age patterns of working hours, the l;fe csc Ic mud1 ak
implies paths for consumption, savings, and assets over the cycle. Thy im-
plied consumption and saving behavior was derived formally and empiri-
cal tests were performed using the Survey of Economic Opportunity data
In the final section, the life cycle approach, rather than the usual single-
period models, was used to predict and analyze the expected labor sup-
ply effects of proposed income maintenance plans. An enipirical simula-
tion of the likely impact of these programs is also provided.
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, economists have made major contributions toward
our understanding of the labor supply decisions of individuals. The theoretical
structure oi the traditional labor-leisure choice model was generalized ina
seminal article by Gary Becker (1965). His household production modelper-
mitted time to he entered in varying intensities in all the commoditiespro-
duced by individuals.
Jacob Mincer (1 962) argued persuasively that an individual's decision about
the amount of hours to exchange tor market dollars is often madeiii a family
context, a view he pioneered. Hence, the hours of work of any family member
depend not only on his wage and other variables specific to him,but also on
similar variables of other members and on those variablescommon to the
family unit. The household production model providesa useful theoretical
framework for the analysis of family labor supply issues.In this model, the
family is viewed as if it werea small firm producing its ultimate wants within
the household. In order to satisfy thesewants, the family (firm) combines
-
chased market goods and services with thetime of various family members
This approach differs from the traditionaltreatment of the labor-leisure choice
decision since the price of any activitynow has two componentsthe goods
price and the time price of each family member.The relative empiricalimpor-
tance of the two components depends, ofcourse, on their respective shares in
the cost of producingan activity.
It has been demonstratedin a number of statistical studies thatmany empiri-
cal regularities are consistent withan economic explanation of the allocation of
time.' Yet, it has also beenapparent that serious deficiencies emain in the
theory. In the one-period framewoikin which the model is p)aced, thevaria-
bles that determine the levelsof market participation are long-runor perma-
nent measures of wage rates andwealth. Since the reference periodrepresents
a full life span, the model is best suitedto predicting average lifetimepartIcipa-
tion rates. However, individualsare also confronted with teniporalVariations in
wage rates and other variables thatcould elicit timingresponses about the
long-run levels ofparticipation desired. A completenodel ot labor supply
206 James P. Smithshould Incorporate thenipact of this variation on the timing of market
responses. In a recent book, Ghez and Becker (1975) extended Becker's original
one-period model to a lifetime context, and thus theywere able to place in
sharp focus the previously neglected influence ofcyclical, seasonal, and life cy-
cle movements in wage rates and other variables.In this paper, I build on their
work by treating explicitly the family context in whichthese decisions are
made. In the processIinvestigate two related issues: (1) how each family
member's available lifetime stock of time is distributedover time between
market and nonmarket activities and (2) thepotential within each family unit
for substituting the time of one member for that ofanother.
THE liFE CYCLE MODEL
In deciding on the number of hours each member should supply,the family is
actually confronted with two problems. Given the long-runor permanent
values of family wealth and the wages of the individualmembers, the family
detemines the lifetime levels of market time of each ofits members. In addi-
tion, since the family is faced with temporal variations inwages and other
variables, a decision must be made concerning the optimaltiming of hours of
the individual members. A any moment in time, let the familycombine market
goods and time in such a way that the cost of obtaining thedesired bundle of
commodities is minimized. But the consuming unit alsomust allocate its con-
sumption over time in a manner consistent with its taste forcommodities in
the future and the expected prices of the future commoditiesrelative to pre-
sent prices. Combining this intertemporal utility maximization problem with
that of the least-cost combination of inputs of time and goodsto use in each
period yields some interesting and testable predictionsconcerning individual
members' allocation of time to market activitiesover time.2
Assume for simplicity that the intertemporal utility function ofa family that
has a horizon of n periods (equal to itslife span) is of the CES (constant
elasticity of substitution) variety; so itcan he written
(1u=(fflz1r(e_d.)'11
where U is family utility, Z represents the level ofconsumption of "com-
modities" in period t, a is the time preference parameter, andcr1 is the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The Z'sare produced within
the household by employing as resources both purchased marketgoods ()
and the time inputs of the husband () and wife ()
(2)Z = B,f(X, M, f)
( '-.li.'' -. -:
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where us homogeneous (it degreeone, andis a technical parameter that
permits the efficiency of production to vary withage. The family is faced with
both time and money constraints thatan he written (using the price of market
goods as numeraire) as I,
fN +N11T;t=1.2.....
f X e'dt = .1 +,',)edt 4-A11
1) 0
The time constraint (3a) indicates that thetotal amount of time (1 which is
given) available to each family member inevery period is absorbed either in
the household productionprocess (home time) or in hours at work (N,,. and
N1). Equation 3b states that the discountedvalue of money expenditureson
goods is equal to the discounted marketearnings (with W representing the
market wage) of the husband and wifeand of initial property wealth (A). The
two constraints combine easily intoone, as follows:
(41R = .1 irZ, e"dt
where
RTJ(W+ VY)e'1th +,
is Becker's 'full wealth"concept, and
Ill=(X, 4-s,,,,\i, +
is the average or unit cost of production of ZWhen ir, is minimized, it is inde-
pendent of 7,, and therefore is the marginalcost or shadow price of 4
Equations 1, 2, and 4 constitute thecomplete structure of the model.It is as- sumed that the faii desiresto maximize lifetime utility (equation1) subject
to the production function (equation 2)and the wealth constraint (equation4).
This problem is easily solvedwith a two-stage optimizationprocedure. First,
maximize utility (1) subject to the budetrestraint (4), with prices (n,) takenas given, to obtain the demand function(or consumption function) forthe basic




where P is the lifetime"price index" of the basiccommodity.





208 lames P. Smithwhere a is an index of family time preference, and a > 0 indicates preference
for the present; a < 0, the future; and a0, neutral time F)refererce.
Note that the fullwealth term (R/drops out when we consider chane in
the levels of consumption over time. Ii individuals do not have unbiased ex-
pectations about future earnings, then the level of full wealth does not change.
Therefore, with these assumptions, an individuals full wealth will not affect the
change in consumption from one period to the next.
The second step in niaximizing lifetime utility involves minimizing the price
(71) at each age t. At cost minimization, the following holds for the inputs of
the husband and wife, where ir,,is the Allen (1967, pp. 503-508) partial
elasticity of substitution between inputs land /, and S measures the cost share
of an input in the household production process:
dMdZ dw, dw,.dB -- =- (So, + Sa-,,) f-- + SFcT., h
Substituting (6) and (7) and expressing the changes in commodity prices in
terms of input prices, we have the respective demand equations for husbands'
and wives' home time:
dM dw,,
= (Sfcr( ± So± So,)
M
dF
-.-- = + S,?a-,I + S1 Of\)
F'
dw, dB
+S1(tra,)+ cr,)ra) + a1)-s--
dw,,, dB,
+ .S,,,r\- a-,) + o,)r - a)+- (a, 1
Equations 8 and 9 indicate that the hours of work of each family member,
given the parameters of the utility and production function, are determined by
variations in the price of time of both members, the rate of interest, time pref-
erence, and any changes in the technology of household production in the
course of the aging process.
To illustrate: as the real wage of the wife increases over the life cycle, the
amount of her time spent inthe household will decline for two rea-
sons:(1) Because the price of one of the inputs is rising, the relative price of
future commodities also rises. The resulting decline in future consumption will,
on this "scale" effect, reduce the demand for her home time. The magnitude of
this effect (represented by S1o,) depends on the possibilities for intertemporal
substitution (i.e., the larger o, the more elastic is the demand curve for com-
modities) and the share of the wife's time in total costs. (2) Substitutions can
I
I
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also be made within the prnductionprocess. As tincreases, the other two in-
puts will be substituted for the wife's time. This effect ± Sa-) will also
lead to a decline in the use of her timeas her real wage rises.4 It follows that in
periods when the real wage of the wife is high, the predictionof the model,
ceteris paribus, will he that her hours of market work willalso be high. Note
that in contrast to the traditional one-period labor-leisurechoice, the sign of
this effect is unambiguous. Since full wealthis fixed in this analysis, there areno
income effects. It is, of course, thepresence of income effects in the static
theory that leads to a negatively slopedsupply curve of hours.
As the real wage of the husband variesover his lifetime, the effect on hours
worked by his wife is again determinedby the two avenues of substitution. In-
creases in the price of his time witi also raise theprices of future commodities
and induce a fall in theuse of all inputs, including his wife's time. However,in
the prodLiction process, the relativeprice of her lime will be declining; hence,
lper unit of output will increase if the two timeinputs are substitutes (o
> 0). Thus, the relationship between thebehavior of hours of work of the wife
I
and the husband'swage is ambiguous. II commodity substitutionswamps sub-
stitution in production (o > o-) hermarket hours wilt increaseas her hus-
band's real wage rises. The rolesof a positive interest rate andthe degree of
time preference are the standardFisherian ones. A positive interestrate (by
lowering discounted prices)and time preference for the futurewill increase
future consumption and decreasehours of work of alt familymembers. The
interpretation of the term dB/B isan interesting one. Since this technical
change is of the Hicks-neutralvariety, a 1 percent improvementin efficiency
will lower future prices by 1percent and increase the amountconsumed in the
future. The effect on theuse of inputs is ambiguous becauseinput require-
ments per unit of output have alsodeclined by 1 percent. Whethertime at home increases withan improvement in the efficiency of hometime depends
on whether the elasticity of demandfor commodities isgreater than 1(a-, - 1 > 0).
LIFE CYCLE PATTERNS
Because the available dataon the actual age patterns ofmarket work for married men andwomen were limited in their detailand quality, Iconstructed a new set of profiles froma subsample of the 1967 Survey ofEconomic Oppor- tunity (SF0). Theseage profiles turned out to bequite fascinating and illus- trate, in a way not possible withmultivariate regressiontecriniques, the rich- ness of the life cycle approach.
The subsampleconsisted of those black andwhite families with both
spouses present. It was furtherrestricted to nonfarm familiesin which the bus-
210 James P. SmithL.easn.&ac
band's age was between 18 and 65 inclusive. The husbands were required to
have worked at least one week in 1966. At each husband's age, arithmetic
means of the labor supply and wage variables were calculated. To smooth the
data. three-year moving averages of the means were taken. In order to observe
racial and educational differences, the total sample was stratified by race and
by the level of education of the husband. The education groups were elemen-
tary (grades 1-8), high school (grades 9-1 2), and college (grades 13 or higher).
The SEQ sample is described in more detail in Appendix B.
Since these profiles are derived from cross-sectional data, we are not, as we
move along any profile, following a single cohort through its life cycle experi-
ence. Each observation represents a separate cohort at one point in its life cy-
cle path. The entire profile captures not only movements along life cycle paths
but across profiles of different cohorts as well. If the between-cohort effects
are important, these profiles must be adjusted in order to have a "pure" life cy-
cle profile. The large seculai increases in labor force participation rates for
married women suggest that, for this group at least, the across-cohort changes
are not negligible.5 Since these rates have increased over time, an adjusted pro-
file for those of cohort age 19 in 1967 would be above the profiles presented
here. This qualification should be kept in mind in the discussion that follows.
The problems associated with cohort effects are discussed below.
In Table 1,Ilist the average lifetime market participation levels of married
men and women in different education and racial groups. Not surprisingly,
market participation of married white women is well below that of married
white men. This difference is reflected in all measures of market work. In an av-
erage year, over 40 percent of white women specialize exclusively in activities
in the nonmarket sector. Those women who are participants work fewer
weeks in any year than men arid fewer hours in any week. The spread in male-
female market productivity, as measured by hourly wage rates of $3.44 and
$2.16, no doubt accounts for much of the gap in market hours per year. After
the schooling period, annual market hours of whites quite clearly increase with
level of education. The rise in annual hours takes place in both measures of
labor supplyweeks worked and hours worked per weeka phenomenon
readily explained in the one-period model by the rise in the level of male
market wages as level of education rises. Within every education class, men
spend approximately tour times as many hours in the market sector as do
women. Relative to their wives, men's lifetime market participation and hourly
wage both increase with level of education.
The lifetime levels of market participation of men are lower, in all dimen-
sions, for blacks than for whites. These lower levels are paralleled by the
smaller hourly return of market activity to black men. In fact, the intrafamily
wage structure differs by race. Compared to whites, relative male-female
wages of black families are lower, offering market incentives to the latter to de-
vote fewer hours of the wife's time to home work. Compared to white
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women, black women indeed perinrrn more market work, both absolutely and
relative to their husbands. Racial comparisons for women must be made care-
fullyfor the magnitude of the differences by race depends critically on the
measure ol labor supply used. In many studies of female labor supply, weekly
labor force participation rates are used to compare racial groups. These rates
are 50 percent higher for black women, but that figure grossly overstates the
true racial differences. The fraction of white women in the labor force is smaller
than the fraction of black women, but white women in the labor force work
more hours per year than black women. Therefore, when measures of working
time include zero values for nonworkers, black women work about 100 hours a
year more (almost 20 percent more hours) than white women.
More intriguing than the levels are the fluctuations between different stages
of the life cycle. Life cycle variations in market work of married white men are
illustrated in Figure là. The inverted U shape in the overall pattern of annual
working hours contorms quite well to implications derived from the life cycle
model. When the age profile of wage rates is combined with a positive in-
terest rate, both the inverted U shape and the age scheduling of peaks in the
graphs of hours worked become intelligible. Since wages are relatively low for
the younger cohorts, the latter have an incentive to concentrate their time in
nonmarket pursuits. A positive interest rate is consistent with the decline in
hours during the older ages and the peaking of hours before wage rates.7 The
resulting lower discounted prices of future consumption increase the derived
demand for home time at older ages. A positive interest rate also implies that
discounted commodity prices will decline before real wage rates and that
peaks in annual working hours will lead peaks in wages.8 Since hours peak be-
fore hourly wages, earnings will necessarily decline before hourly wage rates.9
Wages begin to fall in the late fifties (Figure ib), while earnings profiles are
known to peak in the late forties or early fifties. Although the existing literatire
FIGURE 1Annual Market or Home Hours and Hourly Wage Rates of All
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FIGURE 1(continued)
has emphasized such factorsas human physical depreciation withage, i.e., de- terioration in health or disinvestmentsin human capital, apparentlya substan- tial fraction of the declinein earnings for olderpeople may be due to in-
dividuals optimally allocatingtheir time to homeactivities)°
The profiles generated forblack men add additionalsupport to the life cycle model. Their annual hoursprofile (Figure 6a, below)also has the invertedU formthe expected shapein view of theage variation in their hourlywages and positive interestrates. Hours worked peakat a younger age than for whites, reflecting inour model the earlier maximumvalue of black hourly wages (Figure 6b). The latterobservation implies thatextreme values of com- modity pricesare reached at a youngerage for black men than forwhites, which in turn leadsto the confirmed predictionon the earlier peaking of their market time. Both theworking time andwage profiles are somewhatflatter for black men than forwhites. In the life cyclemodel, the degree ofcurvature in the hours profile is directlyrelated to theamount of curvature in thewage pro- file.
FIGURE 1(concluded)
0.87 (e) Hours at home ofmen,
relatlue to Women
0.77
19 23 27 3i 35 3943 51 55 59 63
Aof hubar.d
souRcEData for all fIguresare from the 1967 SEO survey
/ (f) Wages of men relative 1.30
to women
.20
19 23 27 3! 35 39 4347 51 55 59 63
Age of ha,tbar,dInterpretation of the ditterences among white men classified by education
groups is difficult because of fluctuations evidently caused by the smaller cell
sizes of these groups.11 Still, the age pattern of male annual hours within each
education class (Figure 2c) is on the whole similar to that of the complete
white sample, although the validity of the initial period of rising hours in the
elementary profile is questionable. Because the cell sizes are small, the data for
the under-thirty section of the elementary profile are erratic, with the result
that no clear trend can be discerned. The tendency for the annual hours pro-
FIGURE 2Hourly Wage Rates, All White Married Men and Women, By
Educational Level of Husband
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/
Elementary \._tiles to flatten Out for theless edu atedgroups is Consistent with the flattening of the wage profiles.Because wages peak later forthe more educated (Fig- ure 2a), the empirical finding thatthe more educated thegroup, the later the age at which annual market hourspeak is a lurther confirmationof one implica- tion of the life cycle model.
Economists have usecJa number of operational definitionsof women's labor Supplyweeks worked,weekly or annual workinghours, and weeklylabor force participationrates. In recent papers,Gronau (1973), Lewis (1969),and Hanoch (1976) haveargued that, froma theoretical perspective thesesupply definitions shouldnot be viewed as alternativeempirical measures ofan identi- cal theoreticalconcept. The hours profiles ofmarried whitewomen are a strong empirical confirmationof the Gronau-Lewisargument. Itis clear from Figure 3 thatany single definition, ifconsidered in isolation fromthe others, would yield a misleadingdescription of the lifecycle pattern of thelabor sup- ply of women. The bestsingle descriptivestatistic combinesa measure of labor force participationwith annual workinghours of workingwives Average time at home (Figure ic)at any age is definedas a weightedaverage of time spent at home by workingand nonworkingwomen, with the weights beingthe frac- tion ofwomen working and not%vorking.12 At thebeginning of the cycle,aver- age market hours of allmarried whitewomen (Figure ic)are relatively high,
FIGURE 2(concluded)
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with a substantial traction of women working atsome time during the year
(Figure 3d) but on an irregular and short-terni basis, as indicated by the low
number of weeks worked (Figure 3a). Then, time at home increases contin-
uously into the middle thirties as many whitewomen leave the labor force
completely. This increase in home time is mainlya consequence of declining
weekly and yearly labor force participation rates. The small increasein hours
worked of working women could be either a true increase in the workyear of
the remaining labor force members or merely a compositional effect resulting
from the withdrawal of women from the labor market whose working time had
been well below the average. Following the home-time peak in the thirties,
women spend an increasing amount of their time in the market sector until age
fifty. This expansion in market activity appears in all four supply definitions of
Figure 3. Although average market work at age fifty is almost identicalto the
level of the peak at age nineteen, the two peaks are quite different. Atage fifty
the fraction of yearly labor force participants is well below the fractionat age
nineteen, but the older participants have a much longer workyear. Indeed, as
we proceed through the cycle, we find a dramatic tendency for women to in-
crease the length of time they spend in the market once they commit them-
selves to entering it. This decline in labor force turnoveramong women is re-
flected in both the increasing levels of weeks worked and the steady decline in
the absolute difference between the yearly and weekly participation rates.
After age fifty, the profiles are characterized by a decline in annual market time
as women once again leave the market. Those who remain continue to in-
crease their participation within the year.
To illustrate the distinction between the cross-sectional and time seriespro-
files for women, I have linked together the annual Current Population Survey
(CPS) cross sections of labor force participation rates byage, 1947-1 974, for
married women living with their husbands. This allows us to follow the labor
force experience of the cohorts of 1 894 to 1943 for twenty-seven consecutive
ages. The section of the life cycle covered obviously varies with the cohort.
From Figure 4, it appears that the historical experiencecan be described rea-
sonably accurately as one in which the life cycle profile of each successiveco-
hort lies wholly above the one preceding. The principal difference between the
cross-sectional and time series profiles is that the double peak characteristic of
the cross section is not present in the time series. Whatappears in the cross
section as a sharp decline in the labor force participation rates of women dur-
ing the childbearing ages is actually a temporary leveling out of these rates in
the time series. Following the childbearing period, both the cross-sectional and
time series profiles show a sharp increase in participation rates into the midfif-
ties, although the level of the peak is considerably higher in the time series.
Finally, the decline in participation after age fifty seems to be identical in both
graphs. Clearly, for the empirical work described below, some assumptions









FIGURE 3Weeks Worked, Weekly Hours,and Yearly and Weekly
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FIGURE 3(concluded)
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A sequence of events occurringduring the lifeycle. an F)osWlated to
explain these profiles formarried women. At the yOUflgeSt ages, Wives are SUE)-
stituting their market timefor their husbands' as he completes his schooling in
vestments. The complex processof faniily lorinatiori with its changing de-
mands on women's time is a major lactorduring the remaining Stages.The
values for mean number of children under seven at ages 24. 34, and 43 of the
husband are 0.51, 0.91, and 0.15, while famiy size itself, defined as the number
of children living at home, stabilizesaround age thirty-four. The declinein
market work into the rnidthirtics is therefore l)aralleled by an increase in the
number of preschool children. As these children grow up and begin their for-
rual education, the wife is released from sonic of her home duties, and her
market activity increases. The profiles after age 53 might be caF)turing the
period when children are leaving home to attend college or to marry.
One should recognize, however, that niany aspects of women's profiles are
also consistent with life cycle variations ri the relative wages of their husbands
Compared to their husbands, white women's hourly wages are relatively age-
invariant (Figure 1 d) and, also, peak at an earlier age. One prediction of human
capital theory is that the greater the amount workers invest in themselves, the
more rapidly their wage profiles will rise and the later the profiles will peak.1
Women who expect to spend a smaller fraction of their future time in the
market than men will have correspondingly less incentive to invest in market
forms of human capital. The profile of the wage of husbands relative to wives
(Figure if) has a concave shape, with the largest increases occurring at the
youngest ages.14 Relative to his wife, both a husband's wage and his market
time are lowest at the youngest ages. The most rapid increases in his relative
market time (Figurele) before his midthirties occur simultaneously with the
sharpest increases in his relative wages. Therefore, these profilesare not in con-
flict with a model allowing interfamily substitution of timeas the value of the
time of one of the members changes. 01 course, the movement in relative
wages and the family formation process jointly contribute to the observed allo-
cation of time between the two sectors.
If white wives are classified by their husbands' educationallevel Figure5],
the principal differences are the following: (1) before age thirty, wives' non.
market hours are negatively related to their husbands'educational attainment;
(2) between ages thirty and fifty,women in the college group engage in home
activities to a much greater extent than thosein either a1 the other two
groups; (3) after age thirty, the difference in levels betweenthe college group
and the other two is much larger thanthe difference between high school and
elementary groups; (4) themore educated the group the later the peak level of
















































































































































































































































































































Iany in relative terms(Figure 5h), to flatten out is greater. the lower (lie edLJ( d-
tional level of the husband.
All five dissiniilarities are consistentwith differences among education
4 groups in age-related variationswithin family units in market and nonniarket
productvities. The positive correlation at the youngest agesbetween women's
market participation and husbands'educational attainment presumably results
from the higher expected levels offuture relative male wages of the iiiorr edu-
cated. Wives of more educated menhave incentives to concentrate their
market activity during the years when thehusband's comparative advantage in
market activities is low. The more rapid withdrawalof those women from the
market sector as their husbands reach theirmidthirties coincides with a steeply
rising relative male wage.1 Between agesthirty and fifty, relative male wages
and market hours increase with educationallevel, and the largest differences in
FIGURE 5Annual Home Time of All White Married Women, by
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both relative hours and relative wages are between the high school and col-
lege groups. The more educated the group, the later theage at which the peak
levels of both female relative home time and male relativewage are
achieved.1b Finally, as predicted by the model, correspondingto less curvature
in the relative wage profiles for the less educated is the decline in thecurvature
of the relative hours profiles.
Note that for all whites and for every education subsample,variations in
relative market productivities of spouses become less importantas the family
unit grows older. The profiles of relative husband-wife market time beginin-
creasingly to mirror life cycle movements in the relative nonmarket productiv-
ities of spouses. The decline in relative male market time betweenages thirty
and fifty is caused by changes in female nonmarket productivityas the fraction
of women with young children at home falls. Afterage fifty, this variation in
norimarket productivity is also less importantas children leave home. The lack
of variation in either relative market or nonmarket productivityis matched by a
generally constant relative hours profile during this period.
The profiles for black married women (Figure bc)are more similar to the ob-
served profiles of black men than they are to those of white women.17The
market hours profiles of black married men and women havean inverted U
shape. This translates into a very erratic black husband-wife relative hourspro-
file (Figure 6f) with no clearly discernible trend. The sharpestcontrast between




(b) Hours at home of men relative to women
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(b) Male hourly wage
(d) Female horrIy wage
FIGURE 6Annual Market or Home Hours andHourly Wage Rates of MI
Black Married Men and Women
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-2.00 0thirty-five. During this period, black women are spccialzing more in market
pursuits whie their white female cUi.Iilterf)dIts diC cipj)i(*iiJ hug their [)t'dk level
of home participation.
A number of factors could acCount for this striking difference between black
and white married woolen. The reIatve male-female wage structure for blacks
exhibits less variation over the cycle (Figure 61) than that of whites. This would
imply that the relative hours variation for blacks should also he smaller. The
patterns of child spacing and timing also offer a partial explanation for the
hours behavior of black women. The latter do not generally concentrate their
childbearing within a relatively short time interval. Because of this, they have
less incentive to respond to the presence of young children by lowering their
market PartiCiPatioil. Another factor is the higher rates of marital instability
they face. Thrs increases the cost of complete home specialization for blacks.
Finally, the black wage profiles might he dominated by secular increases in
black wage levels. The observed decline iii black female wages with age (Fig-
ure 61) is surely not a life cycle phenomenon but an indication of the improving
status ol the younger cohorts. In the empirical sections that follow, the evi-
dence on these hypotheses is investigated.
EMPIRICAI TESTS
Methodology
The ideal data for a test of life cycle theory would be observations on the same
individuals over a number of years. Since extensive panel data covering large
parts of the life cycle are lacking, the more available cross-sectional surveys
were used instead to simulate the preferred data set. Fortunately, Ghez has de-
veloped techniques that, under appropriate assumptions, make cross-sectional
information usable. First, the sample is stratified by the age of the husband.
Mean values of all variables within each age group are calculated. In the ab-
sence of secular growth. the observed variation between these age cells will
correspond to the expected life cycle variation for any cohort if its expecta-
tions are unbiased on average.'8 Using equations B and 9 and aggregating over
all families at each age (t) of husbands, we have the following, neglecting
changes in home productivity and consideration of all the familiar aggregation
problems:
dM, dW,, d
= a, + a, + a3
dF, dW1, dWm,
,
Family Labor Supply 225Upon integrating, we obtain
10log M (+ C log tV,,,, +log W, + c,t
(11)log F,d0 + d1 log W, + d, og W,m + dt
Equations 10 and 11 are the demandequations for male and feniakmeti
as estimated by the respondents. Fromthe theory, we expect thatc and
will be negative, since increasingthe price of a factor inducestwo substitution
effects, each lowering theamount of time at home. The signs ofc, and d, can-
not be predicted a priori becausealtering the wage ofone spouse produces
conflicting incentives for theuse of time by the other. c3 and d,are age coeffi-
cients and capture the interplayof interest rates and timepreference. If families
have neutral time preferencesand face positive interestrates. c and d3 will be positive.
In this empirical strategy,itis implicitly assumed that ini years families of age fin 1967 will be ina situation identical to families ofage i -i- fin 1967. Yet
we know that real wages havegrown over time; consequently,younger co- horts have a higherexpected real wealth. As longas real wages grow at a con-
stant secular rate, the estimatedwage coefficient will be unbiased,but the age coefficient will be a biasedestimate of the interest rate effect.19Intuitively, we understand that if real wealthgrows at a constant rateover time, wealth be- comes perfectly negativelycorrelated with age and allwealth effects are picked up in theage variable.
The main empiricalresults are basedon the 1967 SEQ subsample described
above. Although all thevariables used are listed anddefined in Table 2,a few deserve additionalcomment. Flours spent in homeproduction is a difficult variable to measure precisely.One simple solution forhusbands is to treat all nonworking hours as timespent at home, i.e., CHR1 M.which is simply the dif- ference between totalnumber of hoursper year (8,760) and thenumber of working hours. This methodhas several shortcomings,since many nonworking hours are spent neitherin producing norconsuming but in investing in human capital both on the jobor through formal schoolingin job search, and inpoor health. Moreover,we know that the numberof hours engaged inthese activ- ities varies considerablywith age (i.e.,investments generallyoccur at the youngest ages while sick daysare more numerous for theelderly). To reduce the biases causedby time spentat school, regressionswere run that included persons in each schooling classwho were at leastseveral years older than those typicallycompleting that class. Thusthe college samplewas run over the age intervals 26-64; and theelen1entar sample,over ages 18-64. The SEQal- lowed me to obtaina measure of the timespent looking for workand a crude measure of annual hoursin sickness.2o In thesecond definition ofmale home time, CHR2M, timespent working, looking forwork, and in illnesswere sub- tracted from totalyearly hours.
a
226 James P. Smith
h
,-I
TABlE 2Definition of Variables in SEORegressions
Variable Name' Definition
HRS Flours worked in SEQ survey week
WKSWK Weeks worked in 1966
WKSWK2 Weeks worked and looking for workin 1966
WKSWK3F Weeks worked in 1966 forwonien who worked in
1966 and during SEQ survey week
WKSWK4F Weeks worked in 1966 forwomen who worked in
1966 and did not work in SEQsurvey week
HRYR Annual hours worked 1= (HRS)(WKSWK)]
CHR1M Male annual home hours 1= 8,760- HRYRM
LFPWK Fraction of women working in SEQsuivey week
LFPYR Fraction of women working in 1966
CHR1F Female hours at home= (1[FPYR) 8,760 f LFPWK
(8,760 - HRYRI) + (LFPYR- LFPWK) L8,760
- WKSWK4F) (HRSF) (\VKSWK4F/'sVKSWK3F) Ii
HEALTH Annual hours ill
CHR2M Male annual home hours (= 8,760
- NWKSWK2M)(HRSM) + HEALTHM]}
CHR2F CHRIF - (HEALTH ± female lime lookingfor work)
WKWG Wages before deductions in SEQsurvey week
HRWG Hourly wage = WKWG/HRS
WKY Workmen's compensation for injuriesincluding sick
pay and unemployment compensation and public
welfare payments)
QADI Social Security payments andgovernment private,
and veterans pensions
WTHY Interest, dividends, rent, annuities, and royalties
AGE Age of men
KLJSV Number of children under sevenyears old
air the regression tables,sums' variahft' rsanies irs side auIiiIettpr \% or oak or Fft'ir,ik' A prets letter denotes log values.
Defining home time for marriedwomen is even more difficult. It would be
misleading to consider only the behaviorof participating women, for this ig-
nores completely the home specialization ofnonworkersTherefore,all
women were divided into three categories: (1)women who did not work at
all; (2) women who worked bothin the survey week and the previousyear;
and (3) women who worked duringthe previous year but riot in thesurvey
week. Average home time forwomen (CHR1 F) was then defined asa weighted
average of the home time of women in eachcategory, with the weights being
the proportion ofwomen ri each category.21 In the second definition offemale
home time (CHR2F) time working,looking for work, and in illnesswere ex-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6To reduce the effect of measurement error, three-year moving averages of
all variables were calculated. Since the number of observations in anage cell
varied with age, heteroscedasticity in the error term was expected. Thecon-
ventional remedy was applied of weighting each observation (age (Tell) by its
cell size.22 Each of the variables is discussed separately because eachone Cap-
tures an important aspect of the life cycle process and reveals important
lessons concerning the modeling of labor supply.
Behavior of the Variables
Life Cycle WagesFor both the white and black male samples, theown-wage
elasticity (male hourly wages.) has the predictednegative sign. The persistence
of this finding is encouraging, for thiswage coefficient is likely to be strongly
biased toward positive values. Hourlywages are computed by dividing weekly
wages by hours worked in the preceding week. Thus,any positive errors pres-
ent in hours will reappear as negativeones in hourly wages, introducing a
spurious positive correlation between home time and hourlywage rates. Sec-
ondly, true wage ratesare underestimated at the younger ages because of self-
financing of on-the-job training. Timespent in job training activities is expected
to decline with age; hence thissource of bias will be a declining function of
age. Therefore, the observed wage variation withage exceeds the true one,
biasing the wage elasticitiesin Table 3 toward zero values. Using the niale
weekly wage from thesurvey in place of male hourly wages providessome
control over the measurementerror biases, since weekly wages and home time
are separate questions in the SEQsurvey. As expected, the coefficienton the
male weekly wage variable ismore negative than the one for male hourly
wages. The extent of the bias in thecomputed hourly wage should benega-
tively related to theaverage number of observations in eachage cell. Ap-
parently this was thecase, for the difference in magnitude of the weeklyand
hourly wage coefficientswas largest in the samples with the smallestcell
sizesthe black and education-specificwhite samples. In all five samplesof
Table 3, the size of the maleweekly wage coefficientswas similar and all had
the predicted negative sign.
An additional test of theerror problem in variables was performed.A second
weekly wage measure couldbe computed from the SEQdata by dividing the
previous years earnings by theprevious year's weeks worked. Theweekly
wage variable used in the textwas constructed independently of the(depen- dent) hours variable. Thisis not true of the weeklywage measure just given.
Hence, regressions using thelatter still contain thespurious negative correla- tion between market timeand wages. lithe coefficientsof the two weekly
wage variables are compared,it would be expected becauseof the error prob- lem in variables, thatthe coefficient on thesecond weekly wage is lessnega- tive than the coefficientsreported in the text. Also, thedifference between the
230 James P. Smithtwo wages should be negatively related to average cell size. Both propositions
II were supported when the second weekly wage concept was used.
I anticipated difficulty in estimating an independent effect for female wages.
First, the true life cycle variation in women's wages is small compared to that of
men's; so it should play a smaller role in explaining the timing of market partici-
pation of family members. Secondly, during any week, approximately 60 per-
cent of married women are not working. Therefore, each mean female wage is
based on fewer observations than the mean male wage, and on this account,
the former is probably less reliable than the latter as a descriptive statistic of
the true wage of working individuals. The third problem is that the value of
time (shadow home wage) of nonworking women is not necessarily equal to
e the observed wage of workers. Gronau (1974) has pointed out that for popula-
IY tion subgroups in which a large fraction is not working, the observed wage dis-
ly trihution represents only one section of the total wage offer distribution. The
s- unobserved section has been rejected by job seekers as unacceptable. As
a Gronau also demonstrates, the observed wage may change without any altera-
- tions in the wages offered by firms, owing to what he calls a selectivity bias. For
example, in years when there are young children present in the home, the un-
ed plicit home wage increases and many women will leave the labor force.ri-
deed, it is only the women receiving the highest wage offers in trie distribution
e, who will remain in the labor force. Only part of the observed life cycle varia-
ale tion in female wages reflects a real change in their market opportunities. In
e spite of these considerations, the female own-wage effect in the female equa-
me tions (Table 4) is consistent with the model. When female weekly wages are
he used, the coefficient is negative and significant in all but the high school sam-
ny pIe. As expected, a less significant and smaller negative effect is obtained for
ga- female hourly wages. Thus, the negative sign of the own-wage coefficient in
both the male and female regressions supports the predictions of the model.
nd Nevertheless, because of the biases mentioned above, a little skepticism is in
cell order for the female wage even though the estimated sign is "correct."
of As long as the time inputs of spouses are sufficiently strong substitutes,23 the
iad sign of the cross-substitution wage term will be positive. In almost every male
sample an increase in the female wage increases the amount of male home
nd time, although this effect is not always significant. Also, the male wage has a
the positive sign in the all-white, high school white, and college white regressions
kly for female home time. The only troublesome results are the negative signs for
en- male wages in the regressions for elementary school whites and, especially, all
en. blacks. Some idea of the extent of substitution between inputs can be oh-
ela- tamed it we subtract the demand equations for wives from that of husbands. If
ekly we then add the two wage coefficients, we have S(a- o). When this
rob- number is positive, market goods are a better substitute for men's time than for
ga- women's. For the total white sample, this appears to be the case. In the
the education-specific samples, goods are a better substitute for men's home time







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4than for woolens only in the college and high schoolsamples. lii the all-blat k
and elenientary whitc sariipks, this relation switches andgoods 1pF)ear to hea
better substitute for women's time than men's.
One test of consistency suggested byconsumer demand theory is [hat the
slopes of these cross-substitutionterms should he equal, that is, i',,
= FIOW. However, in terms of both elasticities and absoluteslopes, an
increase in the male wage hasa larger effect on female home time thanan
Increase in the female wage on male home time. However,it is probably inap-
propriate to impose this restrictionon consumer behavior. Much of the adjust-
ment for women takes the form of rather largechanges from no work to thirty-
plus hours per week; hence, itis not surprising that F/aW >
Table 3 also contains regressionsfor alternative definitions of hometime. In
addition to working time,tinie spent looking for work isnot counted as avail-
able for home productionin constructing LCHR2. Theoretically,one cannot
predict the effect on home-timewage elasticity of excluding timespent look-
ing for work. On the one hand, thatelasticity evaluated atany wage will be
greater (in absolute value), sincemean home hours will be lower. On the other
hand, the slopecomponent of the elasticity expression (&M/Jshould de-
cline. Hence, the net impactof excluding search time dependson the com-
parative strength of the twoeffects.24 Although the resultsdid not differ sub-
stantially from those obtainedwith the first definition of hometime,-' there was a tendency for theown-wage elasticity to decline for all malegroups, sug-
gesting that the slopes of the demandcurve had decreased sufficientlyto of 1- set the lower number ofmean home hours.2mIn the other definition of home
time, LCHR2, hoursspent working, looking for work, andin illness were sub- tracted from total yearlytrue annual hours. The additionalexclusion of ill time
generally had the effect of reducingthe observed wage elasticities,with the re- sult that any negative relationbetween wages and illtime was not strong enough to offset the reductionin mean home hours.
Interest Rates and TimePreferencesThe age variablegave the least satisfac- tory results. It a family faceda positive interest rate, hometime of both men and women waspredicted to be positivelycorrelated with age. Whenhome time was taken to includeall nonworking hours,the only male samplein which age had a significant positivesign was the elementaryone. The age variable was positive in most of thewhite female samples.The negativecorrelation be- tween age and workingtime implied by the lifecycle argument couldbe ne- gated in cross sectionsif intercohort changesare important. Measuredage dif- ference capturesmovement both along the pathof life cycle hoursand across the profiles of differentcohorts. The rising levelsof male and femalewages throughout thetwentieth century will affectdesired working timethrough the
234 James P. Smithfamiliar substitution arid wealth ef1ects.For men, the time series evidence in'
e dicated that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect. therefore,
the cohort effect conflicts with the life cycle expectation. The substantial in-
the creases in recent decades in the labor force participation rates of married
women suggests that the secular effect should strengthen the negative relation
an of age and working time implied by the life cycle model. Another factor con-
an founding the interpretation of age in these regressions was the strong positive
.ap- correlation of sick time with age.2 When sick time and time spent searching for
ust- work were excluded from home time (definition CHR2), the positive age effect
rty- was eliminated from the elementary mate and white female samples. In fact, a
significant negative sign was obtained in the all-white male and all-black fe-
In male samples.
au- The low values of the Durbin-Watson statistics indicated that positive serial
not correlation existed in these regressions. Since each observatuon was a three-
ok- year moving average, errors tended to perpetuate themselves,and autocorre-
I! be lated residuals were expected.29 In this situation, ordinary least squares will not
ther generate biased coefficients, but the calculated standard errors are generally
de- too low. In evakating the statistics, a degree of caution is in order.
om- The serial correlation that plagued the male regressions was present in the
sub- female ones as well. The use of three-year moving averages was not sufficient
here to explain all the autocorrelalion. Female home time was overestimatedbe-
sug- tween ages 2 2-28 and 45-5 2 and underestimated in the other age intervals.
off- Such a long, persistent pattern of positive or negative residuals does not result
ome from a three-year moving average but is caused by other factors related to the
sub- age ordering of the observations. Some possibilities areexamined in the 5cc-
time tion below on chfldren.
e re- Family Size and CompositionWithin a family unit and across different
trong families, the demand for home time is related to a variety of family characteris-
tics that affect the incentives provided by the market sector. To obtain a proxy
for these factors, I followed the conventional approach of economists by in-
cluding as an independent variable the number of children younger than age
isfac- seven (KUSV).3° The effect of young children inreducing the market participa-
men tion of women has been well documented by others. But my work showsthat
home it is also a factor in the supply functions of white men: it has the oppositeef-
vhich lect of increasing their working hours. One hypothesis consistent withthis evi-
riable dence is that children and those commodities complementary to children are
n be- less husband-time intensive than a vector of all other home-producedgoods.
e ne- When young children are present, the structure of household consumption is
e dif- altered in favor of the former set of commodities, enabling husbands towork
across additional hours. Another plausible rationale is that units o1 time typically may
vages be used to produce many household commodities jointly. Asthe wife leaves
h the the market to care for children, her time will simultaneously beemployed in
iith Family Labor Supply 235other home activities as well, thus treeing SoI1C ol her hLisbdnd's time ho
market work.
In every white sample, teinale home time increased when young children
were present. Sin( e the absolute size ot the coetticierit of KUS\' was greater tor
wives than husbands, both the percent and absolute number ot teniale hours
withdrawn from the market exceeded the percent and absolute increase in
market hours of their husbands. Evaluated atmean levels, the addition to the
household of one child younger thanseven would lead to a net reduction of
approximately $263 in family earnings.The number of young children had no
significant effect on the working time of black wivesor husbands. Indeed, this
lack of response to thePresen(e of children was a major behavioral difference
between the two racial groups. High priority should hegiven to a complete
study of the causes of this dissimilarity. On he basis ofmy work here,I offer
two explanations based on black-white differences in thepatterns of child
spacing and timing and on the higher rates of marital instabilityamong bla( ks.
In the tabulation below, which shows theperdent of families with children
younger than six, the fraction of the life cycle during whichyoung children are
present is longer for blacks than for whites:
Because the childbearing period is lessconcentrated for blacks, there is less
incentive for black women to limit theirmarket participation to thoseyears
when young childrenare not present. Since the expected probability of disso-
lution of the marriage is higher forblacks than for whites, it is rational foreach
black spouse to avoid becomingtoo specialized in either the marketor non-
market sectors, The costs, interms of lost job seniority and depreciationin
market skills, of leaving the marketsector for even a short period decrease with
the expected duration ofmarriage. Racial differences in female hours behavior
were especially evident in labor forceparticipation rates. During the childbear-
ing period, there wasa substantial decline in the participationrates of white
women, but the rates for blackwomen remained remarkably constant formost of the life cycle,suggesting that black womenwere reluctant completely to
leave the market sector.
Although the Survey ofEconomic C)pportunity is theprincipal data source
used in the analysis, the SEQestimates were checked byrunning similar regres-
sions with 1960 and 1970Census data. The SEQ andCensus estimates are compared in Table 5. Thereis a strong degree of conformityamong the three
samples. In particular, the Censusresults parallel quite closelythe male and fe-
Age of Husband















236 James P. SmithIf the omitted variables operate similarlyon both spouses, the correlation in
residuals will be positive. Wealth would be includedamong such variables and,
perhaps, generalized, market-oriented ability,which may be positively corre-
ss lated between spouses. For the completesample, except 1 960 whites, the sig-
rs nificant positive correlation between the maleand female residuals indicates
a- that important variablesare missing from these equations.
:h In a second step, each samplewas divided into two age groups (18-41 and
42-65) to determine if therewas a life cycle element to any model misspecifi-
in cation. In all four samples, the size of the positivecorrelation in residuals in-
creased over the life cycle. In fact, for the whitesamples, there was no evi-
dence of any relation between residuals for theyounger half of the sample; the
Ir- missing variables probably reflect factors relatedto childbearing and spacing
Ic that operate in opposite directionson the allocation of time of men and
St women. A more efficient method of estimation would beto use this correla-
tion in residuals between male and femaleregressions to estimate both equa-
tions jointly but this strategywas not pursued.
A simple count of the number ofyoung children at home cannot be ex-
pected to measure many changes during thecourse of the life cycle in those
re characteristics of family structure that determinea woman's labor market be-
havior. Indeed, the pattern of residuals in the white femalelabor supply regres-




male wage coefficients estimated with theSEQ data. This conformity extends
to the disturbing negative malewage coefficieni iii the borne timeregression
for black women. For the othervariables, the Census regressions in factare
more consistent with theory. In each sex andrace group in both Census years,
a positive age coefficient is found. The absence ofa positive effect in the SEQ
male equations is disturbing. Theregression based on the 1970 Censusrepro-
duces the positive impact of childrenon the labor supply of white men. How-
ever, in the 1960 Census regression, KUSVwas insignificant in the male equa-
tion. The general similarity in estimatesamong these three data sets is encour-
aging.
The relationship between the residualsin the male and female regressions
also conveys information about thenature of factors oniitted from thesere-
gressions. The simple correlations between theseresiduals for the 1960 and
1970 Census regressions areas follows:
Age Group
Whites Blacks
1970 1960 1970 1960
18-65 .18 .05 .41 38
18-41 .07 -.04 .35 .27













reTABLE 5Regressions for Comparing the 1970 and 1960 U.S. Censuswith
1967 DEO Data
(figures in parentheses areratios)
Log of male home hours
Whites
LHRWGM LHRWCJE AGE KUSV Constant
albe variablesare dentfed in Table 2
hours wereoverestimated in the age intervals28-41 and 55-65, whilepositive residuals were presentri the supply equations duringthe other ages. Theex- tent of the labor marketresponse of marriedwomen could dependon their children's ages aridsex and on their aspirationsfor educating theirchildren
Independent Variables
1970 Census -.0851 .0087 .0004 -.0049 8.94
(20.9) (0.65) (4.72) (2.21) (193.8)
1967 SEQ -.1040 .020 .00014 -.0178 8.92
(6.88) (0.82) (0.67) (4.60) (52.45)
1960 Census -.0707 .0207 .0008 -.0007 8.83
Blacks
(1 9.8) (2.28) (11.1) (0.94) (16.68)
1970 Census -.0748 .0270 .0053 -.009 8.81
(3.10) (0.62) (2.67) (1.65) (991.5) 1967 SEQ -.0643 .0455 .00001 -.0107 8.86
(2.16) (1.71) (0.031) (1.35) (255.6) 1960 Census -.0481 .0198 .0010 .0104 8.81
15,39) (1.64) (6.54) (3.20) (999.5)
Log of female home hours
Whites
1970 Census .0444 -.0841 .0014 .0478 8.95
1967 SF0
(5.49) (3.11) (7.36) (10,89) (358.9)
.0444 -.0396 .00057 .0359 8.95
1960 Census
(2.741 (1.50) (2.54) (8.68) (491.7)
.0233 -.0314 .0015 .0388 8.95
Blacks
(2.47) (1.35) (7.90) (11.5) (657.7)
1970 Census -.0401 -.0605 .0006 .0184 9.02
19675E0
(1.72) (2.56) (3.36) (3,53) (509.0) -.1367 -.0395 -.0004 .0048 9.14
l960Census







TABLE 6Effect of Childrerf's Age on Working Time of Their Mothers
Indicates Cl fec tis to rccea so h( iris 01 wok
-lndc a Los &'fkis to dcc lease hours 01 s ork
lndcatos I yauc. esthai, 1.0
.5)
(child quality). Also, the interaction of these characteristics among siblings, in-
cluding the spacing of children, might he iniportant. To separate some ot these
factors, I defined a group of variables measuring the labor force participation of
women grouped according to the ages of their children, using a set of mutuall
exclusive child-age categories.
From Table 6, in which the results obtained with these variables are sullinlar-
95 ized, it is evident that the allocation of a woman's time varies considerably
with the ages of her children. Since preschool children are notoriously high de-
manders of their mother's time, it is not surprising that in almost all saniples-
an increase in the fraction of families with only preschool children reduces the
7 7) working hours of svives. An interesting interaction occurs when the preschool
children have sib!ings who are all over thirteen. The amount of market work
.02 performed by mothers in such families either differs little from the annual hours
0) worked of childless wives or, as is the case for black wives, the mothers ac-
14 tually work more. It appears that the tendency to reduce market hours when
9.5) young children are present is offset to some degree by substituting the time of
.96 older children in some child-care activities.
5.8) But the most interesting finding is the positive effect on female market time
of children six to thirteen or children older than thirteen. The common
denominator of most economic models of fertility is that children are assumed
to be relatively wife-time-intensive commodities. Yet, labor supply evidence
here indicates that tha factor intensity of children might well switch as a child
itive grows up. Parents with preschool children consume a relatively (wife-) time-
cx- intensive commodity. However, as these children grow older they become less
their time-intensive to their parents, with the result that there are stages in the life
Idren cycle when the presence of an older child makes household consumption
Groupings of Children fly Age (years1
All whites -4- -- -
All blacks + '4 + '4







Under13 or or All OverOver
ft 6 UnderOver 13Ages6-13 13 6S
more goods-intensive than in childless tamies. There issome additional ('Vi-
dence in suoport ot this notion of fa( torreversals during the CCiCri every
sample except elementary school whites, thepresence of children over thir-
teen induces more additional female market time than thepresence of children
six to thirteen. Some of the older childrenare attending collegea quite
goods-intensive commodity froma parent's point of view, 13e ausea larger
traction of college-educated whites have childrenattending College, itis also
consistent with this hypothesis that in whitefamilies, the additional hoursof
work of wives with childrenover thirteen increases with educational level.
The lesson for economists in theirmodeling of family behavioris that
children should not he treatedas a hnniogenous commodity. Avariety of
children's characteristics determinesthe relative input intensities ofhonie pro-
duction and the ability ofwomen to substitute market time forhoLisehold
time. Many characteristics (schoolattendanre, age) are by theirnature in-
timately associated with specificstages of the cycle.
Non/abor Income, Assets, andSavingsTo measure the rateat which hours
are withdrawn from the market dueto a 'pure' income change,economists generally use an aggregate ofall current-periodnonearnings income. This
measure often containscomponents that do not correspond to thetheoretical
construct. For example, eligibility for
unemployment compensation, disability
insurance and pension incomeis usually contingentupon the recipient's non-
participation in the market.If these receiptsare included in the income
measure, a spurious negarivc correlationbetween work and incomeis intro- duced. Because of this,I divided all current-periodnonearnings income into
three categories; the first (WKY)consisted of income receivedbecause of un- employment (i.e., unemploymentinsurance, workmen'scompensation); the second (OADI) includedincome from various privateand public pension plans and was also directlyrelated to the amount ofan individual's market work; the final categorywas wealth income (WTHY), whichincluded interest and divi- dends. The lastcategory was intended to beindependent of the work-leisure
choice and, hence, theappropriate one to use in estimatingan income effect.




and their magnitude is determined by current, past, and future expected levels
oi market work, the positive correlation between WTHY and market time is
understandable: individuals with large past and current levels of market work
have generated the assets that produce this income.
One advantage of placing the labor supply decision in a life cycle context is
that a unified theory of asset accumulation, savings, and labor supply can be
developed.35 The life cycle approach clearly demonstrates that any observed
relation between assets (or nonlabor income) and working hours should not be
interpreted as evidence of a causal sequence from assets to market work,
reflecting a wealth effect. Both are siniultaneously determined by similar eco-
nomic forces, and the observed relation may reflect only an individual's posi-
tion in the life cycle.
to illustrate, define savings in the conventional manner as the difference be-
tween current income and current market goods consumption:
S. = -+ w1t'J -+ rA,
where A, net assets at any age t, is given by
A=A04-JSdt
0
Using the time paths of hours and consumption, the change in savings with age
can be expressed as
dw dwr
dS = -- (wmNmE-4-crw,,,i\4) + (w,tNir1- ow3,F1)
Wf
-ir1z, (ocr - a) - (s,,, + sl!)u]} + rdA(
The first two terms in equation 14 capture the effect of life cycle variation in
male and female wages respectively. We have seen that an increasing wage
over the life cycle produces rising paths of working hours and earnings. A suffi-
cient condition (and one that is supported by empirical evidence below) for
family earnings to rise is that the time of the member whose wage has risen is a
substitute for market goods.3If intertemporal commodity substitution out-
weighs production substitution, the age profile of market goods consumption
will have a negative slope. Because rising wages increase family earnings and
either decrease market goods consumption (or increase consumption by less
than family earnings), the life cycle model predicts a positive wage coefficient
in the savings equation.
The age term in the savings equation captures both life cycle patterns and
any cohort differentiation. The life cycle component [-rZo (r a)] de-
pends on the relative size of the interest rate and rate of time preference. If in-


















TABLE 7Family Savings Regressions
(figures in parenthesesare ( ratios)
lfldi'1)endui1t Variables!; Equation
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terest rates exceedtime preterencpc marketgoods consumptionwill grow with age and marketearnings will decline, resultingin a negativeage term in the savingsregression.
Because the model istested Using simulaft'dcohorts derived fromcross sec- tions, the measuredage difference also becomesin part a cohort index.Secular Increases in real wealth biasthe age term inour regression towardpositive values Is, + (s,,, +s,1). is necessa,il'positivej by makingyounger cohorts wealthier than theirpredecessorsIf this bias offsetsthe life cycle effect,the age coefficient ina savings function neednot be negative.18 To test theimplications of thc lifecycle approachon the impliedsavings behavior of families,additional regressionswere run on savings,using wage rates of famnly members,husband's age, andnumber of childrenyounger than seven. Directmeasures of savings donot exist in the SF0:so they were con- structed by taking firstdifferences of familynet worth." Becausethe asset data contained considerablemeasurement error, I smoothedthe asset series bytak- ing three- and tour-year
moving averages andthen taking firstdifferences in the movingaverages. Hence, tocompute savings, weare essentially taking linearapproximati5 threeor four yearsapart in the assetage profile.a1 Because assets willreappear in thesavings computationthree or fouryears later, somenegative serial correlationis present; hencestandard errorsmust be treated withmore than the usualskepticism, Theresiduals were heteroscedasttc becausethe savingsmeasures werecomputed fromassets and the error inassets appears to beproportional to the levelof assetsBecause of















arethis, all observations were weighted by theinverse of assets.47 The savings
regre5sions are reported in Table 7.
A test of the validity of the life cycle approachis the consistency among the
consumption, leisure, and savings equations. For example,a positive age coeff i--
cient in the consumption and leisure demandequations would be inconsistent
with a positive age coefficient in the estimatedsavings function since they all
measure the relative size of the interest rate and rate of timepreference. Life
cycle consumption is estimated in the tabulationshown below. In estimate 1.
consumption is defined as the difference between familyincome and savings,
where savings are defined as net worthat ageless net worth at age t- 1.
Family income equals men's earnings pluswomen's earnings plus all nonlabor
income flows received in the period. Estimate2 is the same as estimate 1 but
with the inclusion of the imputed incomereturn to the net worth held in the
previous period; an interest rate of 5 percentwas used. In both estimates, the
figures in parentheses are I ratios, and the variablesare identified in Table 2;
D.W is the Durbin-Watson statistic:
The severe measurement problem encountered withsavings data is evident
in the low R2 and the lack of significance ofsome of the variables. Still, the em-
pirical estimates basically support the life cycle model.In the savings function,
all variables have the theoretically expected signexcept the female wage varia-
ble, which has an insignificant coefficient. The malewage variable has the pre-
dicted positive sign in the savings function,although its absolute magnitude
seems to be below what we would expect.
Age has the predicted negative sign in the savings function. Aone-year in-
crease in age reduces savings by approximately $60. As pointed out above,
secular growth in real wages biases theage term toward positive values; there-
fore, obtaining the negative age term is encouraging. Theconsumption and
hours equations are consistent with the savings function. Aninterest rate larger
than the rate of time preference leads toa positive coefficient in the consump-
tion and home hours equations. With the possible exception of malehours, my
empirical estimates support this.
The effect of children younger than sevenon savings is negative, although
the t values are not very high. One problem with this variable is thatchildren
are concentrated in a relatively small part of the life cycle. Notice thatas we go
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from a three- toa four-year moving average the childrenvariable beconies
smaller iii absolute size. Thesmoothing process tends to dampenthe Va, jable
because the age rangeover which we are approximating thesavings function
is wide enough to extend beyond theages of concentrated childbearing.
The presence of childrenin the household may affect savings byaltering
consumption expenditures ormoney income. The presence ofpreschool children apparently (Table4) has a depressing effecton the market participa-
tion of women, but theopposite effect of increasing male workinghours (see Smith 1 972). Evaluating themodel at mean market hoursand wages ofmen and women, I findan increase for men of 116 markethours and $405 inearn- ings and a decrease forwomen of 294 market hours and $636in market earn-
ings44-_-a net decrease ofapproximately $231 in familyearnings and a reduc- tion in savings becauseof reduced earnings.
THE SUPPLY SIDE
The supply of market hoursis the mirror image of the demand forhome time. Labor economists haveconcentrated on the former, and forcomparative pur- poses, results using annual markethours as the dependentvariable are re- ported in tables 8 and 9. Asexpected, the coefficientson annual hours for men have the oppositesign and are approximately threetimes larger than the coefficients on home tirne.In cross-sectional studies,negatively sloped male supply functions haveusually been found. Thepositive slopes I obtained inmy estimates are partly due to thedegree of aggregationused in this study, which
presumably eliminatedsome of the spurious negativecorrelation between hours and wage ratescaused by imperfectmeasurement. Moreover, thepur- pose of the type of aggregationemployed was to attenuate thewealth effects, which produce thenegative relation between hoursand wages. Three distinct malewage variables were triedhourlywages, weekly wages, and annual earnings. Glìezand Becker (1975)suggested using annual
earnings to obtain a less biasedwage elasticity by indirect calculation.They ar- gued that earnings havethe advantage of eliminatingthe spurious negative correlation betweencomputed hourly wages andannual working hours. If bis the estimated coefficientof earnings, the impliedcoefficient for hourlywages is/(1 - b). However,although this transformationis algebraicallycorrect, b will be biased upward,since hours enteron both sides of theregression.46 The estimates of thewage elasticities formen, using the three alternative
wage variables, are comparedin the followingtabulation:
All White College High Elementary Black
Direct
Indirect
.3217 .1217 .2581 .0204 .2035
Weekly wage
347 .313 .372 395 .439 .3293 .2583 .3283 4443 .3371
244
lames P. SniithAs expected, the indirect estimatesusing earnings are higher than those oh-
tamed using hourly wage rates. The differen(es in the f'stimatr'are largest tor
the college and elementarygroups. Any negative bias caused bymeasurement
errors in hourly wages is most critical in thesegroups because they have the
smallest cell sizes.
Recently, a number of peoplesee especially Ben-Porath'l 97), Hanoch
1 976, and Cogan 1976) have argued that thevarious definitions of labor sup-
ply that are commonly treatedinterchangeably in empirical work represent in
fact different theoretical constructs. Totest their notions, the regressions were
performed over a number of definitionsof labor supply. Male annual hours
were separated into weeks worked and weekly hoursto determine if the
model would work as well in explaining theseparate components.4 In view of
the similarity in signs and magnitude of theexplanatory variables, the distin-
tions between male supply definitions donot appear to be particularly impor-
tant.
When alternative measures of women's laborsupply are compared, how-
ever, a different conclusion emerges.4 Two definitions of annualmarket hours
and weeks worked were triedaverageannual hours or weeks worked of
those women who were labor force members andannual hours or weeks
worked of all women, includingzero values for nonworkers. The estimated
coefficients from these alternative specifications differsubstantially. The roost
striking contrastisin the age variable;forall women, age tends to be
negatively associated with labor supply, but hasa positive effect when only
labor force members are considered. Therising age trend of weeks worked of
participating women simply measures the decliningturnover in the female
labor force over the cycle. Among older cohorts,the percent of full-time
workers is higher, indicatinga stronger labor market commitment. These older
women in the labor force also understandably increase thereturn on their
market-oriented human capital by workingmore hours in any week. The wage
elasticities are also smaller whenzero values are excluded from the supply
functions. If adjustments are permitted to take placeonly through the number
of hours per worker, the hours response toa wage change is surely underesti-
rnated.9 For some purposes (a study of labor marketturnover), concentrating
on the hours behavior of participants alone may be useful. But thisignores an
important avenue of labor market responsethe possibility of leavingor enter-
ing the market. Only when the zero values are included is it permissibleto in-
terpret the age variable in the mariner suggested by the life cycle modela
measure of the influence of interest rates or cohort wealth. When thezero
values are included, the results for the annual hours andweeks worked regres-
sions are similar and consistent with the implications o the mode!.
The decline in market hours due to thepresence of young children is much
smaller when the zero valuesare not, included. Apparently. the hulk of the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2TABIE 9Female Market Timea
(figures in parentheses areratios)
lndepcndert Variables Dependent
Variables [HRWGM AGE KUSVLWKWCF ConstantR'
'V IiI e VOt1 ten
ages 22-64)
a1 heVa r,ahk. are dnt lied in I a hli
egres,ins were run ('cr the et 01orkirig women unl
withdrawal (a fall inparticipation rates) rather thana decline in hours of work of those whoremain in the labor force. In fact,the addition ofa young child has no effect on the numberof weekly hours. If childrenare a proxy for a fixed (money) cost of working,their presence should heassociated with lower par-
ticipation rates and higher markethours among participants.The existence of fixed money andtime costs of work areundoubtedly the majorcause of differences among thealternative definitions ofmarket work. Fixedcosts not only increase thewage required to induce awoman to work (thereservation wage), but they also creatediscontinuities in the laborsupply functions with the result that theminimum number of hours workedwill be positive and large. In fact, Hanoch (1976)estimates that three-fourthsof the measuredresponse in working hours to a wage changeconsists of tFie jump fromzero hours to the minimum hours suppliedat tte reservationwage.
Theoretical and statisticaldistinctions must be madealso between those labor supply definitionsthat measure variationin hours and weeksamong labor force menibetsand those that simply indicatewhether an individual isa labor force partcii)ant[abor force participationrates (LFPR) are themost com- mon example of the latter definition(important contributorsto this subject are Ben-Porath 1973, Gronau1974, and ewis 1969).A woman's decisionto par-
[ogistic for yearly -.8841 -.0341-.7847 1.438 -0 17
particioaton
rates














HR VRF -. 3036 .0028 - 085 05618 5.25
3.48; 1.94) (3.10 3.82 (809'
'
LHRYRE5 - .3974 -.0121-.5843 1.15 2 53
2.9(y (5.20) M35 4.98 2 49'
.91
LWKSWyj .1)61 .0036-.1163 0.0307 3.37
(1.07) (3.73 6.50) (0.32) (8.02) [WKSWKF" -.2559 -.0135-.5361 0.7663 0 53
2.39) (7.39) 15.8) (4.2) (0.67)12
LHRSF -.2780 .0017 .0018 0.4299 2.0
(4.691 (1 71; (0.10) (4.30) (4 53
.55I
tic ipate in the lat)or force involvesa comparison between her potential market
wage (v) and Ilic value placed on her leisure (home wage"= w) at the zero
work l)osition.° LFPR then measures theproportion of women for whom the
market wage exceeds the homewage at zero hours of work (it fixed costs are
ignored).'1 When LFPR is usedas the dependent variable in a supply equation,
the estimated wage coefficients cannot heinterpreted as measures of the un-
derlying parameters of household productionor utility functions. As we know
from the theory of the firm, supply elasticitiesare determined by two distinct
factors: the supply elasticity for each firm andthe.distribution around any price
(wage rate) of the entry points for firms. For LFPR,the magnitude of the wage
coefficients depends only on the density of the distributionof entry points for
women. The more dense the distribution, the larger the estimatedwage
response [following the argument of footnote51, JLFPR/8W=f(w)(. Clearly,
wage responsiveness is partly a function of the level ofparticipation, with the
largest responses expected aswe move toward the mean and the smallest at
the two extremes of very low or very highparticipation. Unfortunately, econo-
mists have tended to equate results obtained for LFPRwith those for hours and
weeks worked, and also to comparegroups with quite different average LFPR
(men and women, for example) 52
The statistical difficulties encountered result from thecategorical nature of
LFPR if it is used as the dependent variable. When thedependent variable is
binary, the use of OLS is inappropriate for severalreasons: (1(the error term is
also constrained to take two values, with theresult that the errors are
necessarily heteroscedastic; (2) a simple linear regressioncould produce esti-
mates that lie outside the 0-I range; and (3) at both extreme valuesthe rela-
tionship is surely nonlinear. The difficultiesare not eliminated by grouping the
individual data to form labor force rates.
To deal with these problems, several transformations have beenproposed to
overcome the 0-1 limitation on the dependent variable. the simplest tocom-
pute is the logit transformation, which defines the dependent variableas the
natural log of the odds (P of working. Therefore, regressions of thefollowing
form were run:53 lnlP/(1- P)] = B'X' + U, where B' is a vector of unknown
coefficients and X' is a vector of values of the explanatory variables.To correct
for heteroscedastic variances, themoment matrix was weighted by N,P,(1
where N, is the number of observations ina given cell (see Thiel 1975,
pp. 632-636, for a proof of this weighting procedurei.
The SEQ survey provided labor force participation variables definedover
both a weekly and yearly time interval. Although the standard laborforce par-
ticipation rate is defined over a weekly interval, economic theoryis not of
much help in specifying the appropriate interval. Theremay, in fact, be some
reason to prefer the less frequently used yearly rate, which is presumablynot
as much affected by transitory elements. The yearly rate also corresponds



































The t.abor Supply Model
From equation 14, the demand for hometime in differential equation form is
(R\
dMdy) / diredP\ (15)
= (R- -- (Sa+ Scr,)
\P)
dw
± S1cr - + oft -a)
Equation 15 states that the demand for home time forany family member will
be larger (and market hours lower): (1) the larger thefamily's real wealth (R/I;
(2) the lower the cost of consumption at thatage relative to the lifetime price
(ir/F; (3) the lower the wage of the family memberat that age (w,); (4) the
larger the wage of other family membersat that age (s); (5) the older the
family member (assuming that the rate of interestexceeds the rate of time
preterence)
For analytical simplicity, I reduce the incomemaintenance programs to their
two essential provisions: (1) families with zero earnings receivean income pay-
ment of S dollars per year for each year they are eligible for benefits and (2)this
payment is reduced bycents for each dollar of earnings (E) in ayear. The
welfare payments a family receives inany yearare
(16)S=S-p.(E.,1+E)
A family will not receive benefits when family earningsexceed S/pS.
Although these programs are unlikely to alter interestrates or time prefer-
ences, they will affect labor supply through the other categories. As longas
payments are received at any age, a family's real wealth will be increased. Ifa
family is not eligible for a subsidy atevery age, the cost of household con-
sumption will be lowered at ages when paymentsare received relative to other
ages. Finally, during periods of eligibility, the opportunity cost of time ofmen is
lowered.
Wealth Effect
To evaluate the increase in lifetime wealth, itis necessary to know the ages
when benefits are received and the subsidy at eachage. Assume for simplicity
that a family receives benefits only between periodst, and t2 and is not eligible
at any other age. If we let S be the constant subsidy over time periodst1 to2
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that is equivalent (in wealth terms) to the actUal subsidy receivedover the
same period, the increase in real wealth for participants is
(17) R =e'' (1 --
where n is the number of periods in which benefitsare received. The increase
in real wealth will be larger the earlier benefitsare ree;ved (the smaller t), the
larger the number of time periods when benefitsare received, and the larger
the average subsidy per period.
Even this simple representation illustratessonic conceptual and statistical
problems in the existing literature dealing with the wealth effectsof these pro-
grams. In the spirit of the one-period model, researchersare acting as it benefits
are received at every age, implying that S!radec1uatelymeasures the change in
real wealth. But this clearly overestimates the additionalwealth for families re-
ceiving benefits oniy for some fraction of their lives.Even if the appropriate
time horizon for the statistical measures of incomewere known, it would still
be necessary to determine which subgroupsin the population differ in nor t.
This also suggests that the usefulness of thecontrolled experimental data
collected to study FAP is limited. Theexperiments were conducted for relative-
ly short periods of time; for example, the NewJersey-Pennsylvania experiment
lasted three years. The results obtained forfamilies in the experimentalpro-
gram are not applicable to families whose participationin a FAP exceeds the
time span of the experiment. The numberof periods of eligibility is a critical
variable in determining the hoursresponse to a FAP because it determines in
part the increase in real wealth and also the strengthof the substitution effect
between time periods.
The Substitution Fffec(
By holding real wealth (R/P)constant in equation 1 5, we can isolate those labor
supply reactions thatare pure substitution effects. Two relativeprices are al-
tered by these maintenanceprograms: the cost of consuming inone time pen-
od relative to another, and thecost in some periods of usingone input in
household production relativeto other inputs.
If we ignore for themoment human capital investments, thecost of con-
suming (i) in any period is loweredbecause the real cost of using maleand fe- male time in the householdsector falls bthe implicit marginal taxrate (g).
At those ages when the familyis not eligible for benefits, thewages of all family membersare unaffected, but the cost ofconsuming at these ages rel,i-
tive to ages when benefitsare received is increased. Usingequation 15, the
percent decreases in the demand for maleand female home and niarketgoodsThese equations show the importance of distinguishing between the eligible
and ineligible stages of the life cycle. On the substitution effect, market work
of men and women and the demand for market goods will actually increase
a
during the ineligible periods. With the higher cost of household consumption
in those periods, the family has an incentive to reallocate some of its house-
C
hold production toward the eligible periods. This releases time of men and
women from the household sector, and their market work will tend to increase.
However, during the eligible period5, due to the substitution effect, market
hours of men and women should decline.56 The family will attempt to produce
more of its lifetime consumption in the periods of eligibility, increasing the de-
mand for male and female time in the household sector. This effect will be
or stronger the larger the intertemporal demand elasticity the larger the
combined share in household consumption of male and female time (S. +
ri- and the fewer the number of periods of eligibility (1 - Il). Because household
in production costs are lowered by approximately the same percent in all eligible
periods there is no incentive to reallocate consumption between those peri-
ods. As the number of eligible periods increases, the importance of this inter-
C- temporal substitution diminishes. The second term in equation 19, S0M'
measures the incentive to substitute the time of men and women for market
all goods in the household production process. Because the price of each has
Ia- fallen bypercent, there is no incentive to substitute between the two time
he inputs. The family will attempt, however, to substitute both time inputs for
Is market-purchased goods.
I
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time during those ineligible ages are
dMdFdX
-- [a-(S± S)fl].t




is a measure of the fraction of a family's life during which it receivesprogram
A different set of demand equations is appropriate for those ages when the
family is covered. In addition to the lower cost of consuming, there isa reduc-
tion in the opportunity cost of male and female time of j.percent. The home e
time demand equations for eligible agess7 are II
dM--
= [0C(SM + S1) (1 - lU + aJames P. Smith
Human Capital Investment
These predictions concerning intrafamily work patterns are reinforced if we in-
clude human capital investments in the model. As a simplification assume that
all human capital investment costs are forgone earnings, that is, only time en-
ters the production of human capital. If E denotes the earnings an individual
would receive if he did not invest at age t, and C, denotes the dollar costs of in-
vestments in that time period, a person's observed earnings (L') will be L =
- C. This discrepancy between observed and potential wages is important be-
cause the latter represents the opportunity cost of time and hence governs the
allocation of that time among alternative uses. But only observed wagesare
subject to the tax. A marginal tax rate ofpercent will lower observed earn-
ings by the same percent, but potential earnings will fall by z(1- C) percent,
where C is the fraction of potential earnings absorbed by human capital ip-
Vestments.59 Clearly, if individuals differ in C7, their labor supply reactions to in-
come maintenance provisions will differ as well. We can use the theory of the
optimal life cycle path of human capital investment to identify the distribution
of C over demographic subgroups in the population.60 Sinceone determinant
of the probability of these investments is the expected length of futurelabor
force participation, men have a greater incentive thanwomen to invest in
market forms of human capital. Therefore, income maintenanceprograms will
not in general lower the true wages of men and women by thesame percent.
Equations 18 and 19, in which proportionate reductionsin wages are assumed,
are no longer appropriate. For example, if male wages fall bya constant fraction
(A) of female wages at everyage in which benefits are received, the newequa-
tions for men would bebl
dM
= ((AS* S) c11L
for the ineligible period, and
dM
= lo(1 - thkSM + S1)+ S, ffMAX - (1 - A) cT..FSF) JL
for the eligible period. Thequalitative predictions for thenorteligible ages
(equation 22) remain thesame. However, in the eligible periods thefamily has
an incentive to substitute female formale time in home production because
men's wages no longer fallas much as womens. This dampenssomewhat the
previously predicted increaseddemand for men's hometime and further in-
creases the specialization ofwomen in the household.
A well-known implicationof human capital theoryis that investments will decline withage. Thus even in the eligibleperiods, the cost of householdpro- duction will not fall byan equivalent amount at eachage. Rather, the largest
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other during ages 56-60. The model predicts a larger reduction in male working
hours in the older family. As A a negative index of human capital investments)
increases, the reduction in men's wages approaches that of women, and men's
home time increases'2 The principal form of male market withdrawal might
well be early retirement. In the younger family, where the relative reduction in
the wife's wage will be larger than the husband's, the reduction in her working
time will be larger than his.
The incentives to invest in human capital also are altered by programs such
as FAP. 17ch additional dollar of potential earnings used to finance sell-
investment increase5 the subsidy received bycents. Moreover, it, as our
theory suggests, male market hours rise during the ineligible period, the returns
from any investments will increase. Because the fraction of total investment
costs that are forgone earnings is probably higher for on-the-job investments
than for schooling, these programs especially encourage the former.6 We
should also expect some switching to more time-intensive techniques of pro-
ducing human capital and an increase in the proportion of specific job training
financed by employees, II policymakers ignore these incentives to invest and
use market earnings to estimate the number of potential participants in these
programs, their projection for young families opting to receive benefits will be
too low. Finally, encouragement of job investment is more important for men,
but hours spent investing on the job are reported as working hours. This makes
even more plausible the possibility that observed job hours of young married
men will increase during the period when the family receives income transfers.
A Simulation of a Family Assistance Plan
The empirical estimates of the male and female life cycle home time equations
can he used to predict the impact of a family assistance plan. In the tabulation
below, I present again estimates of the pure life cycle home time demand func-
tions for white married men and women (the figures in parentheses are t ratios;
home time = 8.760 hours less average yearly hours worked) :s
Independent Variables
le ages No. of
ily has Children
ecauSe Dependent Iog Male tog Female Younger








home time .1065 .0283 .00007.0158 9.31 .88
(11.71) (1.71) (0.49) (5.92) (241.6)
Log female
home time .0246 .0852 .0007 .0364 9.31 .88
(2.78) (4.20) (4.02) (11.20) (121.31S
//1(1' 256
The demand equation for the pure life cycle model was shown to be
and
(25)log M = a0 + a, log w,, + a, log,. -f a ACE
which are the equations estimated in tables 3 and 4.
These life cycle estimates may be used to siriulate the pure substitution
component of an income transfer.&6 One dif1kulty is that the reactions depend
also on the expected number of yearsa fan iiy will participate and the extent
of differential investment profiles among family members. But byassuming ex-
treme values for the duration of participaton in the program and differential
family investments, limits may be placedon the labor supply effects.
First consider the case of no human capital investments (A= 1). If we add
the male and female wage coefficients in the estimatedlife cycle equations.
we have
dM.
(26a-= -uS1 + Sf) O + So] = -0.0782
dF.
(26b)-- = -tS.Sf) o + Sko]-0.0606
These are the predicted effects ofan income maintenance program for the eli-
gible periods if the family joins for onlyone year ([10). Because the impor-
tance of the incentive to substitute betweentime periods diminishes as the
number of periods of participationincreases, the substitution effect will be
strongest when a family participates for onlyone year. According to the first
two rows of Table 10, for families in which humancapital investment is not im-
portant, the maximum increases in male and femalenonrnarket hours for a
50 percent marginal tax rateare 3.91 and 3.03 percent. On the basis of1966
mean levels of nonmarket time of 6,612 hours formen and 8,196 for women,
the respective reductions in markethours for men andwomen are 259 and
248. in terms of the disruption ofmarket activity, the reduction in markethours
for men is 12 percent and forwomen, 44 percent. The considerably larger ef-
fect on women is dramatic,since on average 50 percent ofmarried women do
not work at all during a year. For workingwomen, this means a reduction from
1,128 hours worked to 632 (a changeof 486 hours). The minimumestimates in Table 8 are obtained byassuming that a family participatesin the program
throughout its life cycle, with theresult that there is nointerperiod substitution
but only substitution betweeninputs in production. In thiscase only the So and components of the total substitution effectare relevant. We can ob-
JamtP. Smith
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0tama lower bound on these by rewriting equation 26b (15 df/E = o- +
- a) = 0.0606.
The positive signs of the cross-substitution effects in the life cycle equations
imply that substitution in production between inputs exceeds substituti0in
consumption between time periods.6' Therefore, crmust he smaller than
0.0606. It is also unlikely that the share of market goods in household I)rduc-
tion is less than one-third. Based on these assumptions, Sr > 0.0378and
S1a 0.0202. These numbers were used to obtain the minimum effect ofa
reduction of 125 hours in the market work of men and 83 hours forwomen.
The maximum increase in market work in the ineligible periods wascalculated
from equation 4 using the upper-bound assumption foroand letting 1
1 68 The predictions for the other investment assumptions we:eobtned
using equation 10 and inserting the appropriate value of A. For themaximum
estimates it is only necessary to multiply the male coefficient by A beforesum
ming the two wage coefficients.69
These results suggest what the theory itself implied: transferprograms will
have a larger impact on the work behavior of marriedwomen than male heads
of households. This is always true for percent withdrawal ofmarket hours. For
an investment parameter of 0.67, the maximum absolute withdrawalof female
market work s twice that of men. When investmentsare important, the redijc-
tion in male market work becomes very small, andwe cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that their market hours will actuallyincrease.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a model toexplain the intertemporal allocationof time of family
members was developed and tested.For white families, the observedcross-
sectional profiles and theregression results seem consistentwith the predic- tions of the model. At thepresent time, only the life cyclebehavior of black married women is difficultto reconcile with the model.The empirical work
suggested three possibleexplanations for this anomaly:(1) dominance of the
cross-sectional profiles by intercohorteffects, (2) patterns of childspacing, and (3) uncertainty about theduration of the familyitself.
APPENDIX A:MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
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with the production function and time and money expenditure constraints de-
sciibed in the text:
cluations
tution in (2)Z, = B I(X, A.4L, F)
(Icr than
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Define the lifetime price index (F as follows








has on one record the asset, debt, and income levels of the family Unit; person-
al and labor force characteristics of both the husband and wife; and sonic lim-
ited information on any children present. A number of additional restrictions
were imposed in selecting families included in the final aggregations. The final
sample was limited to nonfarm72 black and white families in which the hus-
band's age was between 18 and 65 inclusive and in which he had worked in
1 966. I excluded families in which one member worked in the survey week,
but did not work at all during the previous year.7Finally, those families in
which the husband was under 25 years old and in the military were excluded.
The remaining families were divided into thirty-six cells; two race cells (black
and white) each subdivided into three education cells (1-8, 9-12, and more
than 12 grades of husband's schooling completed) and finafly further subdi-
vided into six labor force cells (one division determined by whether the hus-
band worked in the survey week and three possible labor force categories for
wives: no work at all, worked in previous year, and worked in previous year
and survey week). For each cell, arithmetic means of variables were calculated
by aggregating over the age of the husband. Since the probability of being in-
cluded in the original tape was not identical across families, these means were
constructed using the probability of sample inclusion as the weight for the
family. Instead of recording the actual number of weeks worked, the SEQ
coded an individual in a class interval. Since these intervals were not of equal
size, it was necessary to recode by giving an individual the midpoint of his
class. Selection of the midpoint was arbitrary but a more precise estimate
would have required knowledge about the shape of the distribution in each
class.By SEQ definitions, only civilians were considered to be working; so I
assumed that men over age 25 who were in the armed forces worked fifty-one
weeks. I have resisted the temptation to refer to FPWK and IFPYR as labor
force participation rates. Unlike my measure, the official definition of LFPR in-
cludes as participants individuals who were not gainfully employed.76 The
means and standard deviat;ons for the variables used in this study are reported
in Table B-i.
Male Home Specialization
For this study, the final sample was limited to households in which the hus-
bands performed some market work in 1966. For a number of reasons, this re-
striction was not expected seriously to impair the reliability of the results pre-
sented. First, the overwhelming majority of married men were in the sample,
since only a relatively minor fraction of husbands are not members of the labor
force. Moreover, if nonworkers had been included, we would have again en-
countered the problem (as we did for women) of not having the necessary
wage data for that group. A second consideration is the hypothesis that com-
plete male home specialization is due primarily to factors such as ill health and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































participation in schooling and military activities. In particular, it is not generally
the consequence of the faniily relative wage structure. Hence, eliminating the
nonparticipailts made it possjble to concentrate on those families to which the
economic" model is most applicable. To check these suppositions a pass was
made through the SEQ tape not only to count the number of married men not
working in 1966 but also to find the reasons given by them for their nonpartici-
patioti. In tables 13-2 and 13-3, the results of that run are summarized for white
and black men, respectively. If these men had been included, the sample size
of approximately 18,000 would have been increased by only about 600 obser-
vations. More important, only 18 white and 1 3 black men were not working
because of an inability to find work. For 1)0th groups approximately 90 percent
of the male workers gave retirement or poor health as the reason they didnot
work. It seems clear then that very little was lost because of the decision toex-
clude those families from this study.
NOTES
The number of such stud,es has increased so rapidly as to preclude listing them all.
The following model was devetoped in Smith (1972).trelies on the werk of Ghez and
3It is assumed that equations 8 and 9 have an interior solution.
We know that S,o-+ ± = Oand that o-is necessarily less than zero. Hence,
5o5 Sr0 is positive. For a proof of thesc statements,see Allen (1967, pp. 503-508i.
For men, this is not a major problem. Profiles for men may be derived by linkingcross sec-
tions of different years These are essentially identical to those obtained withany cross sec-
tion.
The changes at both tails of the profile area consequence of variation in both weeks
worked and weekly hours. However, the decline in annual hours during themiddle years re-
flects primaril', a lali in hours worked per week,as yearly weeks are somewhat stable
throughout this period of life. This stability is partly due to the SLOdefinitions of weeks
worked, for it includes paid vacations. The duration and frequency ofvacations surely in-
crease with age; hence, a corrected weeks worked measure (vacations excludedmay also
exhibit a decline.
Moie precisely, the crucial factor is the difference betweenthe rate of interest and the rate
of time preference Cr -
For simplicity, assume neutral time preference andno life cycle variation in women's wage
rates. Using equation 8,
dM1
=lrnm + Or
Consumption time will be at a minimum whenmr,,dWmi/Wr) = o-r. Therefore, wages will
still be rising, ldW,r5/Wmt) > 0. when annual workinghours are at a maximum.
Earnings )E) are the product of wage rates (Wiand annual hours worked hI; E= ivh There-
fore, dEIE = (dss'/wIdh/h(df/fl = 0 when dwAs'=dh/h.Since hours decline firstf{dh/h
<01, wages must still be rising when thepercent change in earnings is zero
Observed wages are the net earningcapacity of individuals. If human capital depreciates






tow will peak before gross wages and thereforr' h-fo,e net()hS&lv(-d waes
the average cell sizes br the college. highhO()I. .11k] PteOis'r.tarygroups are 450, and b-f
respectively.
For example let the yearly labor force participation rate be 0.60. Ithe average ssork 'ear
br those women who did participate at some tinie (luring theyear is '.000 hoirs average
market time for all women would he 600 hours and nonnarkettime 8 160.
For the original treatment, see Becker 0975),
Because of individually financed investments in human capital ohervedwages will be be-
low the true opportunity cost of time. Since the lrequencv of theseinvestments declines
with age and is, in all cases, greater for men than for Women thewages of woolen relative
to men will be overestimated at the early ages.
Jacob Mincer and Ar!een Lebowitz have offered an alte'native hypothesisto explain this
phenomenon. They interpret the more rapid dec line iii market work ofcollege-edu( sted
women as a differential response across educabion groups to thepresence of young
especially preschool-age, children. In their hypothesis collegeWoolen have a lornpara0ve
advantage in investing in the human capital of their children.
College-educated men are usually older than those in the losver schoolinggroups when
they start, their families, and this timing is also rcbkk ted in the dating of the-peakin female
home time of the college group.
Because of the small cell sizes, the profiles of black women contain considerablenleasure
n-ent error This is especially true at older ages and is a concomitant of the highrates ot
marital instability among blaks.
That is, individual members of a cohort are permitted to under- or overestimate theirfuture
wage levels. If the average espectation of the cohort is unbiased, the wealth effects flosving
from any individual mistakes will be eliminated in the aggregation
If male and female wages grow at A percent per year over time, the demandequation for
male home time is
dM1 -"'mr
- - o' -----f o-lr - rn + 1 - oi(5+ 5i A - A
Each respondent was asked the length of his latest illness The intervals for this question
were 0,1-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months, and then in number of years. The intervals in
months were given the class midpoints. I then calculated the average ncmher of years that
persons in any age cell were ill. Finally, this was converted to a yearly hours equivalent.
No direct information exists on the number of weekly hours worked by women who
worked only in the year before the survey It vs'as therefore assumed that their sveekly hours
were in the same proportion to those of women in category 2 as their weeks worked were
to weeks worked of women in that category, i.e.. )WKSWK4F/WKSWK3F.
22The motivation behind such a weighting procedure is stia)ghttorsvard To achieve the most
efficient estimate, a lower weight should he assigned to the least reliable observations.e..
those Ihat have the highest variance. However, a cost is incurred in this weighting proce-
dure. The observations that receive the smallest weight occur in the youngest and oldest
age groups; yet these are the observations that possess the largest relative variation in hours
and wages.
Thesignispositivewhen rn15exceeds o.
The wage elasticity of home time isM/W I WI0. Itis reasonable to assume that the
lower the wage, the more hours will be spent searchng for work. Other things the same, a
demand curve tor home time excluding search time would have a steeper negative slope
than one including search time. It should be noted that the measured elasticity of the supply































iarketlatter is then larger, and the increase in market hoursper dollarcrease in wages will he
relatively less.
In many recent studies it has been asserted that thecorrect labor supply function should
include search time. None of these has confronted theconceptual problems involved Ecu
example if unemployment is partlya seasonal phenomenon, seasonal workers may be
compensated for their low hours by higherwages. At their current wage rates, it would he
inappropriate to add this 'unemployment'to their working time
The following table lists the mean values oftime spent looking for work or in illness
If real wages of husbands andwives increase at ,k percent over time, theage coefficient is -+-- 5mc' whereis the Income elasticity of consumption and
sis the combined share of male andfemale time.(1 - srnl corresponds to the incomeeffect; and to the substitution effect.
For example, the simple correlationbetween age and fraction of malewhites who were ill was 0.88 in the SEQ data.
It is expected intuitively that the01.5 estimator will be unbiased,since the slope is as likely to be overestimated as underestimateddepending on the tracking order ofthe residuals However, our uncertainty variance)is larger. But standard errorsare calculated using com- puted residuals, These will betoo low since the estimatedregression line will fit the inap- propriate residuals rather well.
Of course this approachis open to many criticisms, one of themost important being that it
ignores the endogenous character of childrenin an economic model My weakdefense is that single-equation estimationhas a long tradition in laborsupply studies. Also, Iam at- tempting to make a somewhat differentcriticism of the conventionalapproach_that the effect of family sizeon the labor market behavior ofmen and women is related to their life cycle.
According to the first equationin tables 2 and 3, an increase inone preschool child would decrease male home time by0.0178 percent and increase femalehome time by 0.0359per- cent. Evaluated at the mean hometime 01 6,612 hours formen and 8,196 for women, this implies an increase of 107market hours for the men anda reduction of 294 hours for their wives. If respectis'e meanwages of men and wonlenare $3.44 and $216 per hour, this further implies anincrease of $371.52 in men'searnings and a decrease of $63500in women's
32In the two groups in which thiseffect is not strongtheall-black and the elementaryschool whitethe coefficienton the variable for children
younger than six years old has theex- pected sign, but its value is lessthan unity
33One limitation of this variablein SEQ is that it is reported forthe family unit, rather than being allocated among theindividual members. Itis not known if the unemploymentinsur- ance was awarded to the husbandor to the wife. The variable is
more significant in the male regressions, perhaps indicating thatit is the husband's
uneniployment that produces posi- tive results.
34.If the income is foreseen,the expected sign of WTHYwill he zero Becauseit was previousl) capitalized, it will not vary with
age and, therefore, will notaffect the timing of the market worker.
C
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3. A more dctar!cd treatment of thc'ic'Lttiuiishl1, etween assets and
labor supply is contained
in Smith (1976).
36The change in fam:ly earnings for an increase of )percent in the 'oak' wage and' percent in the female wage is:
+ 5m14miMi + w1Fl + XrSmta',is) A -# fI+ s O'( w,M1 + +rr) A
An age term is included in the regression because we integrate
equation 10 before making
the estimate, ir1ZloYr -- )A(s, a'll becomes the coefficient ofthe age term
There are two reasons for this bias. As age increases, realwealth falls by percent, de-
pressing consumption and increasing Savings. In addition,the lifetime price index falls by
+ s)X percent. The result, holdingconstant (as irs equation 18),5 to increase the
relative cost of consumption for each increase ofone year in age, thus reducing consunip-
lion and increasing savings. Note, however, that thewage coefficients in equation 18 are
not affected by the presence of secular growth. Another matterworth investigating is the
impact of secular growth on observed cross-sectionalsavings-age profiles lo study this
issue, it is necessary to calculate the total effect of the wage change
dSr = + w41) -11 - S,1 - 51t - W( 55 + WSmt + 5)rdA1
=A)SV,,rr + w11i + n-,Z1 1rn' ++ c,l A + rdA,
- 44-miN,,rr - + rdA1
= -S4A
As a new cohort enters with proportionately higher wages atevery age, its savings will be
proportionate to the level of the previous cohort. The difference between thisexeicise and
the previous one is that in the latter, if the true change in the life cyclewage is
the observed change in a cross section will be (dWmt/wmrl- A. This is the measured wage
change with age and is captured in the wage coefficient in theregression. To get the total
effect on the savings profiles, the wage coefficient must be addedto the secular change in
wages. The change in savings svuth age will be more negatively sloped atages at which sav-
ings were originally positive and more positively sloped at ages at which dissavingsoc-
curred,
Net worth Consists of the sum of assets held in the formof business, land, home, car, bank
accounts, government bonds, stocks, personal loans, and other assets minus debts in the
form of bu5irress, home, land, car, clothing, fuel, medical, bank, and other debts. The other
assets are boats, furnishings, clothing, many consumer durabies (refrigerators, television,
etc.), cash, pension benefits. inheritances, life insurance policies, and human capital invest-
ments.
Using three-year moving averages, savings at age t = - A1_1)!3.
An alternative would have been to use log savings as the dependent variable, but the nega-
tive values for savings precluded this.
Other weights (the reciprocal of log male hourly wages or tog male earnings) were used as
well. the results were similar to those reported in the text.
Variation in nonmarket productivity biases the wage coefficient in the savings function up-
ward if nonmarket arid market productivity are positively correlated. If y is the percent in-
crease in nonmarket productivity. dS = (1 - a'4i iTly. Empirical estimates suggest that a
< 1 See Ghez and Becker (1975).
The mean male and female hourly wages are $3.47 and $2.17. Mean male and female hours



























is the ratio of male home time to workingtime and is approximately equalto 46if the true re!at;oomeasured ri logs and deviations fromtheir respective meansibetween annual hours (h) and hourlywages 1w) is
(1 hBw + ci
with(u)0 and var hi; = o2u. If earningshy = w + hI are used
(illh= 18/il + 8)IV+ lull+ Bib or h= by + 2




Plimitas n is 55 + e)IyZ/y)
e(yZ; = eif(Bw + u)Zj--_eleWu) 4.
1+8
P limit as N is= b +ii(iB)/vai)y)]. As long as B> 1 there exists a positive correlation between thedisturbance in (ii) and theindependent variable IL); hencei will b biased upward. Alsosince B = b/fl - b) and 8>1 implies b < 1,an indirect estimate of B is also biased upward.
47Only the estimates formale whites are reported
but the conclusions in thetext hold for the other samples also.
48For an excellent theoretical
discussion of some distinctionsbetween alternativedefinitiorss of labor supply,see Hartoch (1976).
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If all women in this group have the same potentialmarket wage, LFPR is simply the shredded
part of the distribution or 1.FPR =f 1kv) dw1Fls), where Ftwi is the cumulative dis-
tribution function.
52This could explain why svomnen's wage elasticitiesexceed men's. Also, we would expect
that as LFPR for women has risenthroughout the twentieth century. the estimated wage
elasticity would also rise.
53.The logistic function is P = [1/li +e)851, where P is the probability of occurrence of
given X.
54The ideas presented in this section werefirst published in Smith (1975).
55.ThroughoutI assume that the characteristics of these programs areproperly auiticipated.
Thus, I ignore all the complex issuesassociated with the effects of unexpected programs.
56flit is assumed for simplicity thatbenefits are rece;ved only between time periods tand t2,
the change in the lifetime price indexcaused by the income maintenance program will be
dP'P fr + K151)f,Ldt
As an approximation we may write
Distribution of home wages
dP;P= "15M + S)fk11tdi l5+
Since S=+ ö, whereis the deviation of the share in thatperiod from the mean
lifetime s'hare, the approximation involvesJ2 k1dt - 0. that is, a weighted average of the
deviations of the time shares from the meanlifetime share is approximately zero. ifl any
case, any error caused by thisapproximation is likely to be small.
This interpretation of [1 holds precisely if theshares are identical in each period. Inthat
case, Jk1dt = nk1 = n/N = fi, where n is thenumber of time periods during which the
family receives benefits and N is the totalnumber of time periods in its lifetime.Even if the
shares are not equal.is a positive monotonic functionot the number of periods of
eligibility, and that is the interpretationmaintained in the text.
57Since both male and female wages fallby the same percent )xl, we ma write
dM1
= - I, - -- 5iMF - ff('l
51Foflowing Ben-Pcirath, let ft oil he the density function of home wages,illustrated below,
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liv a similar prOof the tomatoequationIS
dF1
- tU +
and the market goodsdemand function is
dX1
= +Su( 1flu+
In equation 19, theterm o-(S+- summarizes the tnterperiodsubstitution com- ponent.
It may be rewritten
LT= - Cp. where
TCjEr and pE =11 - This concept of the fraction of potentialearnings that is investedwas introduced by )acobMincer. 60In Mincer's terminology
CT = k1. Mincer uses theage or experience distributionof k1 to ex- plain age profiles of logearnings of individuals. Theoptimal life cycleinvestment model was developed by Ben-Porath(1967).
61This assumes that themale and femaleinvestment profiles are parallel.Obviously, thjs need not be the case. Also,.r now is the percent reduction
in tomato wages. Thefemale equation is
dF






dA M((1I5ifi - ft
Since empiricallya < o-, this derivativeis negative. II job training is
completely general, allinvestment costs willappear as forgone earnings. From Smith (1972)on the basis of data fromthe 1967 Survey ofEconomic Opportunity.The regressions covered whitefamilies in which thehusband and wifewere both present inthe
householdandhusband's age was inthe range 22-64. It is possibleto calculate thesubstitution effect inthe life cycle modelonly becausewe have assumed thata single cohort hasunbiased expettations of futureincomes, with the result that real wealth
remains constant throughout
a cohort's life cycle
experience. The age
variable alsocontans differencesin wealth between
cohorts and thiswealth effectcannot
be disentangledfrom the effectsof the interestrate and timepreferences. Ofcourse, it is
the appealing featureof the life cycleequation that thesubstitution effectcan he isolated. Chez also found thisto he true for thelife cycle equationsfor market goodsconsumption,
thus providing directsupport for theaigument in the text. 63.F he largestincrease in market woikduring the periodof ineligibilitywill occur whena








For the nhiiUT111111 (tirne, t is also necessary to know tr015, antiit S. Rutfrom the life
cycle model oS - 1 0.0283 and - 0.0216; hence cr,11510.0.185
andeS.a - 0.0448.
For a technical discussion of the sampling techniques used and the biases that might he
present in the SEO sample. see 'i%6 and 1%7 SEO Sample Design and Weighting," and
"The Current Population Survey A Report on MethodologyTechnical Paper No. 7,
Washington, D.C., 1q63.
Basically the method used was to impose a cutoff for sample inclusion based on the percent
of nonwhites in an area This percent varied by region and SMSA size. For those sampling
districts above the cutoff, the standard CPS methods were used to select households.
Farm families were eliminated both because of the difficultyof separating their labor in-
come front the return onphysical capital and because the division between market and
borne activities is not clear-cut.
Relatively few families had this characteristic. They were not included owing to the absence
of yearly income data.
These military families were not included because their reported wage rates were ncit a
reflection of their opportunitY costs since they were sub;ect to the coercionof the draft
system in effect them.
The respective intervals used were 1-13, 14.26, 27-39, 40.47, 48-49,and 50-52 weeks. It, as
seems pIausible the distribution of weeks ineach interval is negatively skewed, my weeks
worked variable ibiased downward. this will also introduce a spurious negative correla-
tion between annual hours worked and thehourly wage.
The official definition counts as members of the labor forcethose individuals who daim to
be looking for work.
REFERENCES
Aigrer, Dennis. 1971. "An Appropriate EconometricFramework for Estimating a Labor Supply
Function." Manuscript only.
Allen, R G D 1967. Mathematical Analysis for Economists.New York: St. Martin's Press.
Becker, Gary. 1965. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time."Economic Journal. September.
1975. Human Capital: A Theoretical anti EmpiricalAnalysis, with Special Reference to
Education 2nd ed. Nw York: National Bureau ofEconomic Research The first edition was
published in 1964.
Ben-Porath, Yoram. 1967. "The Production of HumanCapital and the Life Cycle of Earnings.'
Journal of Political Economy, August.
1973. "Labor Force Participation Rates andthe Supply of Labor." Journal ofPolitical
Economy, December.
Bosven, William, and Thomas Finegan. 1969. Economicsof Labor force Participation. Princeton,
NI,: Princeton Univercity Press.
Brumherg. Richard, and Franco Modigliani. 1 962."Utility Analyses and the ConsumptionFunc-
tion." In Kenneth K Kurihara, ed., Post-Keynesian
Economics. Princeton. N I.. Print eton
University Press,
Cain, Glen. 1 966 Married Women in the Labor force.
Chicago: University ot Chit ago Press.
Cain, Glen, and Harold W. Watts, eds. 1974. Income
Maintenance and Labor Supply.
Econometric Studies.nstitute for Research on Poverty.Monograph Series. New York
Academic Prest A Markham Book).


























when aJames P. Smith
Davanzo Julie DennisDefray and David Greenberg. 1)73.(stiiaIiiig Labor upnlyResponse A Sensitivity Analysis. SantaMonica, CalifRand
Defray, Dennis. 1972."Substitutron Between Quantityand Quality of Chrldrenin the Hoijp. hold." Ph.D. dissertationUniversity of Chicago
Fisher Irving. 1965. TheTheory of Interest NewYork: Augustus M KolleyReprint of 1910 viii- lion.
Ghez, Gilbert, and GaryBecker. 1975. The Allocationof Time and Goodsover the Life Cycle. New York: National Bureauof Economic Research
Greenberg, David and MarvinKosters 1970. IncomeGuarantees and the WorkingPoor The Effect of incomeMaintenance Programs on Hoursof Work of Male FamilyHeads Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand.
Gronau, Reuben. 1974."Wage Comparisons_ASelectivity Bias." Journal ofPolitical Economy Hanocfi Giora. 1976. "Hoursand Weeks in a Theory ofLabor Supply " Santa Monica,Calif : Rand Heckman, James. 1971."Three Essays on theSupply of Labor and theDemand for Market Goods." Ph.D. dissertationPrincetcin University.
Kosters Marvin. 1966."lnconie and SubstitutionParameters in a Family LaborSupply Model Ph.D dissertation,University of Chicago
Landsberger Michael. 1973.
"Children's Age as a FactorAffecting the SimultaneousDetermina. tion of Consumption andLabor Supply.' SouthernFcononucs Journal, October. Leihosvitz Arleen. 1971."Women's Allocton of Timein Market and NonmarketActivities Dif- ferences by Education."Ph.D. dissertationColumbia University Lewis, H Gregg. 1957."Hours of Work and Hoursof Leisure." Proceedingsof the Industrial Rela- tions Research Association
1969, "Hours of Workand Labor ForceParticipation Rates."Manuscript only 1974. SchoolingExperience and Earnings.New York: NationalBureau of Economic Research.
Mincer, Jacob. 1962."Labor Force Participationof Married Women"In Aspects of LaborEconom- ics UnlversitiesNationalBureau ConferenceSeries 14. Princeton,N.J ' Princeton Univer- sity Press for NationalBureau of EconomicResearch. Robbin, Lionel 1930."On the Elasticity ofDemand for Incomein Terms of Effort."Economica June.
Smith, lames P. 1972,"The Life CycleAllocation of Time in theFamily Context." PhD.disserta tion, University of Chicago
1975 "On the LaborSupply Effects ofAge-related Income
Maintenance Programs" Jour nat of Human Resources,Winter.
1977, "Assets, Savingsand Labor Supply.'Economic lnqui, October. Thiel, Henri, 1971.Principtes of EconometricsNew York: Wiley.
L5
S